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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1978, the Social Security Administration (SSA) amended its
regulations by adding an appendix termed the Medical-Vocational
Guidelines,2 the major purpose of which was to increase consistency in
the Social Security disability determination process.3 The disability de-
termination process requires complex medical and vocational judg-
ments, because the statute requires that
an individual . . . shall be determined to be under a disability
only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of
such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but
cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage
in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the
national economy .... 4
2. 43 Fed. Reg. 55,375 - 55,379 (1978), codified at 20 C.F.R. §404, Subpart P, App. 2
(1982).
3. 43 Fed. Reg. 55,349, 55,356 (1978). This article refers to disability determinations
under Title II and Title XVI, two programs termed Disability Insurance Benefits and Sup-
plemental Security Income, respectively. 42 U.S.C. §§401-433 (1976 & Supp. IV 1981), 20
C.F.R. Part 404 (1982); 42 U.S.C. §§1381-1383 (1976 & Supp. IV 1981), 20 C.F.R. Part 416
(1982).
Although age and blindness are categories for obtaining benefits under the Supple-
mental Security Income program (SSI), and blindness is an impairment for which one can
receive benefits under the Disability Insurance Benefits program (DI), eligibility determina-
tions based solely on those factors will not be addressed because the Medical-Vocational
Guidelines do not apply in those cases. Children's Insurance Benefits, even for minors who
become disabled, benefits for disabled widows and widowers, and the myriad of other disa-
bility benefits also will not be discussed. See 42 U.S.C. §402(d) (1974, 1976 & Supp. IV
1981) (children); 20 C.F.R. §404.350 - 404.368 (1982); 42 U.S.C.A. §402(e), (f) (West 1974 &
1982 Cum. Supp.) (widows, widowers). 20 C.F.R. §404.355 (1982). For a discussion of
widow's benefits, including eligibility requirements and advocacy techniques, see Fournelle,
Social Security Disability Widow's Benefits.: A Guide for Legal Assistance Advocates, 13
CLEARINGHOUSE REVIEW 259 (1979). For a survey of various Social Security benefit pro-
grams, see D. SWEENEY, J. LYKO, JR., PRACTICE MANUAL FOR SOCIAL SECURITY CLAIMS
(1980).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A)(1976) (emphasis supplied).
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The Medical-Vocational Guidelines (also referred to in this article
as medical-vocational regulations) established a categorical system of
decision-making which uses both textual regulations and tables. A cat-
egorical decision-making system is one that limits the factors to be used
in making a decision to a finite and predetermined set and either man-
dates determinations or establishes guidelines for them.5 Categorical
systems contrast with clinical decision-making, in which adjudicators
are free to respond to all the factors present in an individual case and
discretion may be channeled simply by a general standard. Categorical
systems are often characterized by their use of tables or "grids" and can
focus either on a single factor,6 or a number of factors, as in the Medi-
cal-Vocational Guidelines, which concentrate on residual functional
capacity, age, education, work experience, and transferable skills. The
importance of these guidelines, which play a major role in cases de-
cided by the 700 Administrative Law Judges employed by the Social
Security system to decide over 200,000 disability cases each year,7 was
highlighted recently by the Supreme Court's grant of certiorari in
Schweiker v. Campbell,' in which the Second Circuit severely limited
the impact of the regulations on disability decision-making.
This article focuses on the basic jurisprudential issues involved in
creating consistency through the use of categorical systems and dis-
cusses whether or not the guidelines create accuracy and fulfill their
basic purposes. Broad and normative in approach, this article exam-
ines several issues central to any moral legal system.9 Two of these
basic issues are accuracy and consistency. Accuracy can be defined as
the proper substantive outcome in a case based upon correctly found
5. This article adopts a rather narrow definition of the term categorical. At one ex-
treme, categorical systems are those which have developed through the use of empirical
data. Examples of categorical systems, in addition to the Medical-Vocational Guidelines,
include sentencing and parole determinations which attempt to predict future behavior. In a
very broad sense, the development of categorical decision-making might be thought to in-
clude the development of any particularized rule to replace a vague principle or standard.
In this article categorical is not used to describe this larger phenomenon.
6. For example, the Federal Aeronautics Administration's regulation for determining
pilot retirement uses age as a determinative factor. "No certificate holder may use the serv-
ices of any person as a pilot on an airplane engaged in operations under this part if that
person has reached his 60th birthday. No person may serve as a pilot on an airplane en-
gaged in operations under this part if that person has reached his 60th birthday." 14 C.F.R.
§ 121.383(c)(1982).
7. See STAFF OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON SOCIAL SECURITY, HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS
COMMITTEE, 97TH CONGRESS, IST SESS., SOCIAL SECURITY HEARINGS AND APPEALS,
PENDING PROBLEMS AND PROPOSED SOLUTIONS app. A, app. C (Comm. Print 1981).
8. Campbell v. Secretary, 665 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1981), cert granted sub nom Schweiker
v. Campbell, 102 S. Ct. 2956 (1982).
9. For a discussion of basic legal principles that produce a moral legal system, see L.
FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 95-151 (rev. ed. 1969).
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facts appropriately applied to the proper standard of law. "Accuracy is
• . .the substantive ideal; approachable but never fully obtainable."' 0
Consistency is the treatment of like cases in a like fashion; in this arti-
cle, consistency refers to the decision of disability cases having the
same or very similar characteristics in the same way. Consistency, like
accuracy, is a somewhat ethereal characteristic in disability determina-
tions because "claimants are in fact not identical because of gross dis-
parities in the impact of identical physical impairments on the general
well-being and psychological vigor of different claimants.""
In a properly functioning determination process, accuracy and
consistency should merge. Decision-makers will reach correct out-
comes by properly applying appropriate substantive rules to correctly
found facts, and they will do so on a consistent basis. But consistency
and accuracy, although clearly related, are not the same. It is possible
to achieve highly consistent decision-making but extraordinarily inac-
curate decisions. For example, a highly consistent decision-making
process would result if all black applicants who applied for disability
were granted benefits, but accuracy would be a matter of chance.
Striving for accuracy and consistency exacts trade-offs. Attempts
to reduce inconsistencies can produce over-generalized and inaccurate
decisions. Improvements in accuracy can detract from other related
principles, such as predictability and fairness. Fairness involves not
only the system's actual accuracy, but also its perceived accuracy. This
article examines the Medical-Vocational Guidelines' influence on these
interrelated issues of accuracy, consistency, predictability, and
fairness.' 2
10. Mashaw, The Management Side of Due Process.- Some Theoretical and Litigation
Notes on Assurance ofAccuracy, Fairness and Timeliness in the Adjudication of Social Welfare
Claims, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 772, 774 (1974), [hereinafter cited as Mashaw, Management].
11. R. DIXON, SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY AND MASS JUSTICE 18 (1973).
12. This article will not examine these guidelines empirically, although it recommends
empirical study of the guidelines to determine their effectiveness. See infra § VIII. Several
other interrelated issues are beyond the scope of this article. For example, timeliness is an
important characteristic of any judicial process, and "[t]he characteristic of the hearing pro-
cess that most enrages claimants and congressmen is its torpidity." J. MASHAW, C. GOETZ,
F. GOODMAN, W. SCHWARTZ, P. VERKUIL, M. CARROW, SOCIAL SECURITY HEARINGS AND
APPEALS: A STUDY OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION HEARINGS SYSTEM XXii
(1978) [hereinafter cited as MASHAW, HEARINGS]. Nevertheless, this article will not address
timeliness for three reasons. First, "[t]he basic causes of the backlog of cases at [the Bureau
of Hearings and Appeals and probably the entire Social Security Disability determination
process] and the resulting delay are clear - an increasing demand for hearings without a
corresponding increase in the resources to process the cases." Id. at xxii. Second, the time
parameters for hearings and decisions at the various stages in the process have been set out
by the courts. See Blankenship v. Secretary of HEW, 587 F.2d 329, 334-35 (6th Cir. 1978);
White v. Matthews, 559 F.2d 852, 859-61 (2nd Cir. 1977). Third, and most important, al-
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Any study of a complex system that must balance conflicting pur-
poses would be incomplete without an inquiry into the value judgments
that underlie those trade-offs. The disability determination process ex-
presses value judgments in two distinct ways. First, in a broad juris-
prudential sense, by designing a categorical system, policy-makers
determine which goals will be primary and which will be subsidiary.
For example, policy-makers could decide to promote the goals of con-
sistency and aggregate accuracy even at the expense of individual accu-
racy. This decision is ultimately a value judgment because there is no
objective basis for deciding when one goal is more important than an-
other. Second, decision-makers in individual disability cases carry
their own personal value judgments into the determination itself.
These individual values or biases, often subconscious, can be curbed
but can never be completely eradicated. This article explores some ef-
fects of these value judgments on disability determinations.
The categorical approach has become an increasingly popular de-
cision-making model. 3 Study of the categorical procedures embodied
in the Medical-Vocational Examination Guidelines may facilitate the
proper development and application of categorical decision-making
procedures in other contexts. Before discussing criticisms that have
been made of the disability process and beginning an analysis of the
Medical-Vocational Guidelines, however, a brief explanation of the ba-
sic standard for determining disability and its administration is
useful. 14
though categorical decision-making often promotes efficiency, the Medical-Vocational
Guidelines probably do not result in substantial time savings. Although using the medical-
vocational regulations may result in cost savings, this article will not discuss the fiscal issues
because they are ultimately less important than accuracy, consistency, predictability, and
fairness. A claim, on the average, is worth approximately $30,000, and the administration
spends less than $500 deciding this average claim. Mashaw, How Much of What Quality? 4
Comment on Conscientious Procedural Design, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 823, 824 (1980) [herein-
after cited as Mashaw, Quality]. Although a cost-conscious and budget-cutting mentality
prevails, and substantial questions exist about how much additional money is needed to
increase accuracy and consistency, the amount currently spent on decision-making in com-
parison to the worth of the claim seems more than reasonable.
13. Many states now use formula-like determinations to decide sentencing and parole.
See Note, Sentencing women Equal Protection and the Context of Discretionary Decision-
Making, 6 WOMEN'S RIGHTS L. REP. 85, 100-105 (1980). Cf. Underwood, Law and the Crys-
tal Ball Predicting Behavior with Statistical Inference and Individual Judgment, 88 YALE L.
J. 1408, 1423 (1979) (comparative accuracy of statistical vs. individual decision-making).
14. For a more complete discussion of the process, see D. SWEENEY, supra note 3, at 20-
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II. THE DISABILITY STANDARD AND PROCESS'"
A description of disability determination is best begun with an ex-
planation of the claims-handling process, followed by an examination
of the procedure for determining disability.
A. Claims-Handling Process6
1. Initial Determination-The process begins when an applicant
applies at a district office of the SSA for either Title II (Disability In-
surance) or Title XVI (Supplemental Security Income) benefits.' 7 The
District Office interviews the claimant, obtains information about his or
her work background, and obtains the names of the claimant's physi-
cians. At this point, the SSA District Office refers the claim to a state
agency for the determination of disability. This bifurcated system,
which exists at both the initial determination and the reconsideration
stages, is an unusual example of cooperative federalism.' The state
agency collects the claimant's medical records, and a team composed of
a medical consultant and a vocational specialist decides on disability.
The state agency decision is then sent to the Bureau of Disability Insur-
ance in the SSA Baltimore headquarters for review. 9 The SSA head-
quarters will then inform the claimant of its decision. If the claim is
approved, they will arrange for payment.
2. Reconsideration-If the claim is denied during the initial de-
termination, the claimant is entitled to a reconsideration of the claim
by the state agency. This reconsideration tracks the procedure followed
at the initial determination stage, but the determination is done by a
different doctor and vocational specialist.20
15. Readers familiar with the disability standard and process, both before and after the
addition of the Medical-Vocational Guidelines, are invited to move on to p. 342.
16. This description of the claims process is highly simplified. For a more thorough
description, see R. DIXON, supra note 11, at 24-50.
17. For Title XVI claims, the District Office checks income and resources because the
program is need-based. For Title II claims, the office determines whether the individual is
eligible based on his or her contributions to the social security system from past work. See
D. SWEENEY, supra note 3, at 1-2.
18. Cf. Bloch, Cooperative Federalism and the Role of Litigation in Development of Fed-
eral AFDC Eligibility Policy, 1979 Wis. L. Rnv. 1, 1-8 (cooperative federalism in AFDC
process).
19. The degree of finality of the state agency decision depends on its outcome. The
Bureau of Disability Insurance cannot be more lenient than the state agency, but it can be
stricter. For a discussion of finality, see R. DIXON, supra note 11, at 27.
20. Recipients whose benefits are terminated are entitled to a reconsideration of the ter-




3. Hearing Stage-Following a denial after reconsideration,
claimants are entitled to a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ) of the Bureau of Hearings and Appeals in SSA. This hearing is
the first and only time that a claimant appears before the decision-
maker.2
4. Appeals Council Review--Claimants whose claims have been
denied by an ALJ at the hearing level can request review by the Ap-
peals Council.22 Staff Analysts attached to the council examine the
case and prepare recommendations as to whether to review the deci-
sion. In addition to acting on claimants requests for reviews, the Ap-
peals Council can review granted claims on its own motion. Following
a claimant's request for review, the Appeals Council can refuse review,
review the case and deny benefits, review the case and remand for ad-
ditional medical evidence or testimony, or grant benefits.23
5. Court Review-After exhausting these administrative reme-
dies, claimants can appeal to the United States District Courts, 24 the
Courts of Appeals, and finally the Supreme Court, although the
Supreme Court has taken only a few Social Security Disability cases
since the program's inception. 25
B. The Procedure/or Determining Disability
Statutorily defined, "disability" means the
inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of
any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which
21. D. SWEENEY, supra note 3, at 97-98.
22. For the criteria used by the Appeals Council in deciding whether or not to review a
hearing officer's determination, see 20 C.F.R. §416.1470 (1982) (Supplemental Security In-
come); §404.970 (1982) (Disability Insurance). See also 20 C.F.R. §416.1469-1479; 20
C.F.R. §404.969-979.
23. Although this step is taken by few claimants, they can request the Appeals Council
to reconsider its determination. See 20 C.F.R. §404.987 (1982) (DI); 20 C.F.R. §416.1487
(1982) (SSI).
24. 42 U.S.C. §405(g) (Supp. IV 1981).
25. For examples of the cases that the Supreme Court has taken in the Social Security
disability area, see Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80 (1976) (the government may impose
residency requirements on aliens applying for Social Security benefits); Mathews v. El-
dridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976)(hearing not required before termination of benefits);
Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 637 (1974) (held unconstitutional a provision that
denied disability benefits to a specified class of illegitimate children); Richardson v. Perales,
402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971) (held that medical records could be substantial evidence to support
the SSA burden); Hopkins v. Cohen, 390 U.S. 530, 532 n. 3 (1968) (the wife and child of a




can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be
expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve
months. 26
In interpreting this definition,
an individual . . . shall be determined to be under a disability
only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of
such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but
cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage
in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the
national economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the
immediate area in which he lives, or whether a specific job va-
cancy exists for him, or whether he would be hired if he applied
for work. For purposes of the preceding sentence (with respect to
any individual), "work which exists in the national economy"
means work which exists in significant numbers either in the re-
gion where such individual lives or in several regions of the
country.27
Although this statutory definition of disability has undergone some
changes, 28 the basic test of disability is the inability to engage in any
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable
physical or mental impairment. Disability decisions for both Title II
and Title XVI benefits, unlike the scheduled determinations of disabil-
ity in the Workmen's Compensation situation, are all-or-nothing
situations.29
The regulations outlining the disability determination process es-
tablish a sequential five-step evaluation procedure. This sequential
evaluation is similar for the initial, reconsideration, and hearing stages.
And, if a fact-finder (either the ALJ or state agency team) can decide
that a claimant is or is not disabled at any step in the sequential evalua-
tion, subsequent steps are obviated."
1. Is the Individual Engaging in Substantial Gainful Activi?-
The first step in the process is to ascertain whether the claimant is en-
26. 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(l)(A)(1976).
27. 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(2)(A)(1976) (emphasis supplied).
28. In 1965, the duration of disability was clarified by adding the 12-month period in
place of the phrase "long-continued and indefinite duration." Pub.L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 366
(1965), codfiedat 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(2)(A)(1976) (amending 42 U.S.C. §423(c)(2)(1962)). In
1967, the phrase "substantial gainful activity" was clarified. Pub.L. No. 90-248, 81 Stat. 821
§158(b)(1968), codoedat 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(2)(A)(1976) (amending 42 U.S.C. 423(d)(1962)).
29. An exception to this concept occurs in cases where claimants are found to have been
disabled in the past but are not currently disabled. In such cases, they may receive retroac-
tive benefits but are denied current benefits.
30. 20 C.F.R. §404.1520 (1982) (DI); 20 C.F.R. §416.920 (1982) (SSI).
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gaged in substantial gainful activity (SGA).31 Obviously, a claimant
who is involved in substantial gainful activity does not meet the basic
statutory definition. Consequently, benefits will be denied, and the
process will end at this stage, unless the claim is for retroactive
benefits.32
2. Does the Individual Have a Severe Impairment?-If the claim-
ant is not involved in substantial gainful activity, the fact-finder next
determines whether the claimant has a "severe" impairment. At this
second step, the fact-finder must evaluate whether medical factors sig-
nificantly limit the claimant's ability to perform basic work-related
functions or tasks. If no severe impairment is found, the claim is de-
nied.33 As with step one and later steps, a claimant who is denied can
appeal.
3. Does the Individual Have an Impairment that Meets or Equals
the Listing?-Assuming a severe impairment is found, the fact-finder
then decides if the claimant's severe impairment equals or exceeds
those listed in Appendix I" of the regulations, which lists medical im-
pairments with specific diagnostic requirements.35  Finding that the
claimant's impairment equals or exceeds this listing necessitates a find-
ing of disability and obviates the need for additional steps.
4. Can the Individual Do Past Work?-As a fourth step, the fact-
finder must determine if the claimant is able to return to any work he
or she performed within the last fifteen years. 36 To make this determi-
nation, the fact-finder must assess the claimant's physical and mental
"residual functional capacity" and the claimant's ability to function in
that prior employment situation despite his or her impairment. 37 The
claimant's residual functional capacity, or what the claimant can still
do despite his or her physical or mental limitations, is evaluated ac-
cording to work-related abilities. For example, the claimant's residual
31. 20 C.F.R. §404.1520(b) (1982) (DI); 20 C.F.R. §416.920(b) (1982) (SSI).
32. See supra note 29. Another exception, and one which is quite rare, is the trial work
period. See 20 C.F.R. §404.1592 (1982).
33. 20 C.F.R. §404.1520(c) (1982) (DI); 20 C.F.R. §416.920(c) (SSI).
34. 20 C.F.R. §404.1520(d) (1982) (DI); 20 C.F.R. §416.920(d) (1982) (SSI).
35. Appendix 1 is itself a system of categorical decision-making. Unlike the Medical-
Vocational Guidelines, however, the appendix works only to require grants and not to deny
benefits. This shift from using categorical decision-making solely to grant benefits (Appen-
dix 1), to using it both to grant and to deny benefits (Appendix 2), seems to show a shift in
the way the administration values erroneous denials and erroneous grants.
36. 20 C.F.R. §§404.1520(e), 404.1565 (1982) (DI); 20 C.F.R. §§416.920(e), 416.965
(1982) (SSI).
37. 20 C.F.R. §404.1545(a) (1982) (DI); 20 C.F.R. §416.945(a) (1982) (SSI).
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functional capacity is based upon the claimant's physical ability to
walk, stand, lift, carry, and perform other tasks which might be re-
quired in a work setting3" as well as mental and emotional factors, such
as the "ability to understand, to carry out and remember instructions,
and to respond appropriately to supervision, co-workers, and work
pressures in a work setting."39 In deciding whether or not the claimant
can return to his or her prior work, the fact-finder reviews the medical
documentation and, if this documentation is insufficient, studies other
evidence including the claimant's and other witnesses' statements or, at
the hearing stage, testimony about the impairments and their effect on
the claimant.4 ° If the evidence shows that the claimant cannot return to
his or her prior work, a prima facie case of disability is established.
5. Can the Individual Perform Jobs that Exist In Signjfcant Num-
bers In the National Economy?-At this fifth step in the sequential
evaluation of disability, the fact-finder must determine if jobs that the
claimant can perform exist in the national economy.4' Up to this point
in the sequence, the current process for determining disability is very
similar to that used before the introduction of the Medical-Vocational
Guidelines.42 To understand the importance of the changes made by
the Medical-Vocational Guidelines, one needs to know how the process
worked before their adoption, both at the initial determination and re-
consideration stages as well as at the hearing stage.
At the initial determination and reconsideration stages, a two-per-
son decisional team, would make the step-five decision based upon
both their training and instructions contained in a document entitled
Disability Insurance Letter 111-3. This document, however, does little
more than paraphrase the disability statute.43 In addition, a vague
form of the Medical-Vocational Guidelines may have been used at
these stages, but how widely or consistently it was used is unclear."
The step-five decision was largely within the discretion of the deci-
sional team based on their training.
At the hearing level in step five, the Secretary has the burden of
showing that jobs the claimant can perform exist in significant numbers
in the national economy.45 Before the SSA adopted the Guidelines,
38. 20 C.F.R. §404.1545(b) (1982) (DI); 20 C.F.R. §416.945(b) (1982) (SSI).
39. 20 C.F.R. §404.1545(c) (1982) (DI); 20 C.F.R. §416.945(c) (1982) (SSI).
40. 20 C.F.R. §404.1545(a) (1982) (DI); 20 C.F.R. §416.945(a) (1982) (SSI).
41. 20 C.F.R. §404.1551 (1982) (DI); 20 C.F.R. §416.961 (1982) (SSI).
42. See 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P (1978); 20 C.F.R. Part 416, Subpart 1 (1978).
43. See R. DIXON, supra note 11, at 58.
44. See infra note 90.
45. This shift in burden of proof was established by Judge Friendly in Kerner v. Flem-
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vocational expert testimony was used to sustain the Secretary's burden.
Although there was no absolute requirement that vocational testimony
be given to support a denial, "in the absence of substantial evidence
from other sources bearing directly on the issue of 'substantial gainful
activity,' the testimony of a vocational counselor is essential for the
affirmance of an examiner's findings."'46 At the hearing, before the ex-
amination of the vocational expert, the claimant already would have
testified about his or her age, educational background, prior work expe-
rience, daily activities and hobbies, physical and emotional problems,
and the effect of those problems on the claimant's ability to function.
In addition, medical records, which would have been examined by the
vocational expert before the start of the hearing, would have been sub-
mitted into evidence. The vocational experts would be asked to re-
spond to a series of hypothetical questions which addressed a range of
employment-related abilities that the claimant might be found to pos-
sess.47 For example, the Administrative Law Judge would pose a hypo-
thetical to the vocational expert which would include a series of
characteristics similar to those of the claimant, including age, educa-
tional background, work history, medical problems suffered by the
claimant, and restrictions on the claimant's physical abilities. In addi-
tion, the hypothetical might include emotional impairments character-
ized by deterioration in activities, interests, and personal hygiene, and
impairments in the ability to relate to others and to follow instructions.
At this point, the expert would be asked to address "three inter-related
[sic] questions: (1) What transferable skills does the claimant have?
(2) Are there jobs that he can perform with those skills, given the func-
tional limitations resulting from his medical condition? and (3) How
many such jobs exist locally and in the national economy?"4"
At the hearing stage, the medical-vocational regulations dramati-
cally alter and often eliminate the need for vocational testimony. The
Guidelines take administrative notice of jobs that, given a claimant's
age, education, transferable work skills, and physical limitations, exist
in significant numbers in the national economy and, at least according
to the regulations, can be performed by those individuals. For claim-
ming, 283 F.2d 916, 921-22 (2nd Cir. 1960). It has survived the scrutiny of Congress (the
1967 amendments to the entitlement programs, P.L. 90-248, 81 Stat. 821 (1949), left the
Kerner doctrine essentially untouched) and the courts. See Garrett v. Richardson, 471 F.2d
598, 603-604 (8th Cir. 1972); Meneses v. Secretary of HEW, 442 F.2d 803, 806 (D.C. Cir.
1971). See also MASHAW, HEARINGS, supra note 12, at 75-76.
46. Garrett v. Richardson, 471 F.2d 598, 603, 604 (8th Cir. 1972).
47. D. SWEENEY, supra note 3, at 114-15.
48. MASHAW, HEARINGS, supra note 12, at 77.
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ants having physical impairments, the above questions (2) and (3) are
eliminated from the examination of the vocational expert.
At the initial determination and reconsideration stages, the Medi-
cal-Vocational Guidelines severely limit the discretion of the voca-
tional specialist. As mentioned, the Medical-Vocational Guidelines are
composed of a series of regulations and tables, 49 and classify jobs into
sedentary, light, and medium work.5° Appendix 2 of the Medical-Vo-
cational Guidelines is made up of three tables--often referred to as the
"grid"--one each for sedentary, light, and medium work.5' The fact-
finder at this stage, having already determined the claimant's residual
functional capacity,5 2 must decide whether or not the claimant meets
the exertional requirements of certain job classifications. Once a find-
ing is made that the claimant's residual functional capacity limits him
or her to sedentary, light, or medium work, the fact-finder examines
that table and then charts the claimant's various vocational factors on
the table. These factors include age, education, the level of previous
work experience, and, when applicable, transferability of work skills.
The vocational factors of age, education, and previous level of
work are themselves broken down into several categories. Age is di-
vided into: (1) younger individuals (under age 50), sometimes divided
into ages 45-49 and 18-44;13 (2) individuals closely approaching ad-
vanced age (age 50 to 54); and (3) individuals of advanced age (age 55
or over), sometimes narrowed further to ages 60-64. 54 Education, pri-
marily formal schooling,15 is classified in the Medical-Vocational
Guidelines within the categories of: (1) illiteracy, meaning inability to
read or write, and little or no formal schooling; (2) marginal education,
meaning completion of the sixth grade or less; (3) limited education,
meaning completion of grades seven through eleven; (4) high school
education and above; and (5) inability to communicate in English.56
The regulations classify past work into the categories of: (1) un-
skilled, requiring little or no judgment to do simple duties which can be
49. 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 2 (1982).
50. Id. "Heavy" and "Very Heavy" categories are excluded. The regulations explain
that claimants able to perform heavy and very heavy work in spite of their impairment are
presumably able to find work in the national economy regardless of their age, education, or
previous work experience. Claimants limited to the lighter categories of work, according to
the regulations, are those whose employability is affected by these other three factors. 20
C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 2, §204.00 (1982).
51. See, e.g., infra Appendix A & Appendix B (tables).
52. See infra text accompanying notes 37-40.
53. See e.g., Table no. 3, infra, Appendix B.
54. 20 C.F.R. §404.1563(a)-(d) (1982) (DI).
55. 20 C.F.R. §404.1564(a) (1982).
56. 20 C.F.R. §404.1564(a)-(b)(1982).
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learned on the job in a short period of time; (2) semi-skilled, requiring
some judgment and alertness and possibly coordination and dexterity;
and (3) skilled work, requiring independent judgment, substantial
training, and possibly dealing with personnel, data, or ideas at a high
level of complexity.57 Prior work skills are evaluated for transferabil-
ity, based on whether the same or a lesser degree of skill is required,
whether the same or similar machines or tools are used, and whether
the same or similar raw materials, products, processes or services are
involved. 8
Once the claimant's residual functional capacity and vocational
factors are found, the fact-finder examines the tables, or "grids," of the
Medical-Vocational Guidelines. "Where the findings of fact made
with respect to a particular individual's vocational factors and residual
functional capacity coincide with all of the criteria of a particular rule,
the rule directs a conclusion as to whether the individual is or is not
disabled."59 For example, if a person were found to be able to perform
light work, were of advanced age (over the age of 55), had a limited
education, and had done skilled or semi-skilled work which gave him
transferable skills, the tables would lead to a finding of not disabled.6"
But, if that same individual had done skilled or semi-skilled work but
did not have transferable work skills, a finding of disability would re-
sult if the tables were applied mechanically.6 Conversely, in both
these hypothetical situations, individuals would be found not disabled
if they were less than 55 years of age. The difference in outcome be-
tween these hypotheticals illustrates that age is highly significant in de-
termining disability under the Guidelines. Persons of advanced age,
unlike younger individuals, find it relatively easy to be found disabled
under the Guidelines.
57. 20 C.F.R. §404.1568(a)-(c) (1982).
58. 20 C.F.R. §404.1568(d) (1982).
59. 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 2, §200(a) (1982). The current language of the
regulations suggests that findings of disability are made directly from the tables of the Medi-
cal-Vocational Guidelines. Earlier versions, however, suggested that, instead of finding dis-
ability, the Medical-Vocational Guidelines found adjustment. These earlier versions stated
that
if an individual cannot perform any past relevant work because of a severe impair-
ment(s), but the individual's remaining physical and mental capacities are consistent
with his or her meeting the physical and mental demands of a significant number of
jobs (in one or more occupations) in the national economy, and the individual has the
vocational capabilities (considering age, education, and past work experience) to make
an adustment to work dfferentfrom that which he or she hasperformed in thepast, and it
shall be determined that the individual is not under a disability.
43 Fed. Reg. 55,363 (1978), codofed at 20 C.F.R. §404.1503(f) (1982) (emphasis supplied).
60. 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 2, Rule 202.03 (1982).
61. 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 2, Rule 202.02 (1982).
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Although the Medical-Vocational Guidelines at first appear to
mandate disability decisions, they require that some factors not be
treated in a purely mechanical fashion. For example, the regulations
state that the considerations given to age are not to be applied mechan-
ically in borderline situations.62
In addition, the regulations mandate disability determinations in
cases where the impairments are exertional.63 Where solely nonexer-
tional impairments, such as mental, sensory, or skin, exist, the regula-
tions do not apply. But if the claimant has both exertional and
nonexertional impairments, the Medical-Vocational Guidelines pro-
vide a framework for consideration of how much the individual's work
capability is further diminished in terms of any types of jobs that would
be contraindicated by the nonexertional limitations.' They provide
little guidance, however, on how to apply this framework in deciding
cases. These flexibility issues will be dealt with extensively later.61
III. BACKDROP TO THE MEDICAL-VOCATIONAL GUIDELINES
A. The Criticisms of Disability Decision-Making
1. Inconsistency and Inaccuracy-The Medical-Vocational
Guidelines were developed as a response to criticisms of the disability
decision-making process. Although fiscal issues have dominated recent
concerns66 and some scholarship has focused on those issues,67 most
studies have centered on methods for improving the decision-making
process itself rather than on the fiscal questions.68
62. 20 C.F.R. §404.1563(a) (1982) (DI); 20 C.F.R. §416.963(a) (1982) (SSI).
63. 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 2, §200.00(e) (1982).
64. Id.
65. See infra § IV.
66. Fiscal concerns about the Social Security system seem based on the premise that it is
a disability and retirement insurance system rather than a public welfare program, even
though it functions more like the latter. The inherent solvency of the program continues to
be questionable in light of resistance to using general tax revenues as a means of funding.
67. See, e.g., Martin, The Art of Decoupling." Keeping Social Security's Promise Up-To-
Date, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 748 (1980).
68. In addition to studies performed by the Department of Health and Human Services
(DHHS), its predecessor the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW), and the
SSA, outside authorities undertook major evaluations. See MASHAW, HEARINGS, Supra note
12; R. DIXON, supra note 11; 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §10 (2nd ed.
1979); M. DERTHICK, POLICYMAKING FOR SOCIAL SECURITY (1979). Most studies of the
process have focused on the disability benefit program of Social Security, 42 U.S.C. §§401-
433 (1976 & Supp. IV 1981), but the analysis is equally applicable to the Supplemental
Security Income program (SSI), 42 U.S.C. §§1381-1385 (1976 & Supp. IV 1981), because the
disability standards and decision-making processes are essentially the same for both. Com-




The primary criticism of the system has been its lack of consis-
tency and accuracy in decision-making. For example, in a study spon-
sored by the National Center for Administrative Justice, the authors
concluded that "the inconsistency of the disability decision process is
patent. Indeed, it is widely believed that the outcome of cases depends
more on who decides the case than what the facts are."69 And, in 1977,
the New York Times reported that "the Social Security Disablity pro-
gram has become, in the view of its critics, the most arbitrary of the
government's programs to help the needy, one in which poor people in
similar circumstances often receive vastly different treatment. '7°
A true picture of the accuracy and consistency problems is difficult
to determine. First, the absence of an objective external standard for
accuracy7' makes error difficult to detect. Because the standard of disa-
bility includes a host of factors that must be considered, a different de-
termination of any factor or combination of factors may cause contrary
final determinations. Second, many of the cases dealt with by the sys-
tem are close ones.7 In many of these cases, because there simply may
not be a "correct outcome," the problems of error detection are in-
creased. Third, reliance on statistical information about the Social Se-
curity system is difficult because of differences in the procedural stages,
and because evidence can be added to a claimant's case as it progresses
through the review stages. Also, a claimant's condition can change,
warranting the introduction of new evidence, and, claimants are pres-
ent before decision-makers only at the ALJ hearing. Despite the diffi-
culties in making an accurate assessment, some basic statistics about
reversal rates and variation among Administrative Law Judges point to
the serious accuracy and consistency problems within the disability de-
termination system.
These problems can be seen by examining the rate at which deci-
sions are reversed at various levels along the appeals process, the varia-
tion among decision-makers at the same stage in the claims process,
and geographic variation. Administrative Law Judges have reversed
approximately fifty percent of the decisions that have been appealed to
them over recent years.73 Of course, hearings are more personalized,
69. MASHAW, HEARINGS, supra note 12, at xxi.
70. New York Times, July 27, 1977, §A, at 1, col. 2.
71. MASHAW, HEARINGS, supra note 12, at xx.
72. Mashaw, Quality, supra note 12, at 827-28.
73. Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculusfor Administrative Adudication
in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search ofa Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28,
38 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Mashaw, Due Process]. In 1978, ALJ's reversed 50% of the
initial denials and 54% of the terminations in disability insurance claims. COMMITrEE ON
FINANCE, UNITED STATES SENATE, 97TH CONG. 2ND SESS., STAFF DATA AND MATERIALS
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medical records are more likely to be well developed, and claimants are
far more likely to be represented before an ALJ than at earlier stages in
the process. Nevertheless, the magnitude of this reversal rate reflects
fundamental problems with accuracy and consistency.74 In fact, this
reversal rate could be much higher if it were not for the fact that, until
recently, only denied claims moved through the review process.75 Al-
lowances, which account for more than one-half of the administrative
level of determinations, had not been reviewed by either the Appeals
Council or the federal courts.76 Looking at these reversal statistics, one
might conclude that the disability determination system was designed
to decide clear cases at early stages and have large numbers of ques-
tionable cases reviewed at the hearing and Appeals Council levels. But
because denials are not reviewed except upon a claimant's appeal, this
conclusion does not appear to reflect the intent of the designers. Addi-
tionally, almost seventy percent of the Disability Insurance claimants
whose cases are denied at the state agency level never appeal.77
The variation in reversal rates among ALJ's shows an even greater
problem with the system: the outcome in a particular case may depend
more on the hearing officer selected than on the facts of the case.78 In
1980, only fifty percent of the Administrative Law Judges hearing disa-
bility claims were within ten percent plus or minus of the average re-
versal rate of approximatey sixty percent. Twelve percent of the
Administrative Law Judges reversed fewer than forty percent of the
claims they heard and fifteen percent reversed over seventy percent.79
This variation is similar to that before the adoption of the guidelines.
RELATED TO THE SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY INSURANCE PROGRAM 58 (Comm. Print
1982) [hereinafter cited as STAFF DATA AND MATERIALS]. In fiscal 1979, after the adoption
of the Medical-Vocational Guidelines, the percentages in these types of cases were 56.4%
and 59%, respectively. In fiscal year 1980, ALJ's reversed 59.4% of the initial denials that
came before them for review and 63.8% of the terminations.
74. In addition to the problems already mentioned in trying to evaluate error rate, the
use of reversal rates may skew our perspective on the system. An extraordinarily high per-
centage of disabled claimants who were denied benefits may appeal their cases, and, con-
versely, very few claimants who are not disabled may move ahead in the appeals process.
On the other hand, appeals may more accurately reflect persistence and stamina rather than
actual disability. In fact, a very disabled or emotionally impaired claimant simply may
"give up."
75. 42 U.S.C. §405(b) (1974); 20 C.F.R. §404.967 (1982) (DI); 20 C.F.R. §416.1467
(1982) (SSI).
76. R. DIXON, supra note 11, at 5. Pre-effectuation review is now being done on a lim-
ited scale at the state agency levels and Appeals Council. See Pre-effectuation Review, 3
SOCIAL SECURITY FORUM No. 12, at 11 (1981).
77. STAFF DATA AND MATERIALS, supra note 73, at 58.
78. MASHAW, HEARINGS, supra note 12, at 19.
79. AL Reversal Rates by Percentile, Fiscal Year 1980, 3 SOCIAL SECURTY FORUM No.
4, at 4 (April, 1981).
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Assuming the ALJ's are hearing similar cases, these figures suggest,
and one study has concluded, that ALJ's employ different criteria in
making their determinations, resulting in inconsistency." Some varia-
tion among decision-makers is to be expected, but the wide variation
existing among Administrative Law Judges in the Social Security Ad-
ministration is greater than an acceptable normal distribution.
In addition to variation among state agency denial rates,8' varia-
tion in reversal rates among ALJ's, and variation between the Adminis-
trative Law Judges and the state agencies, the variation among
geographical areas is also great. For example, in one three month pe-
riod in 1977, the average claimant in Springfield, Massachusetts had
only a 14.4% chance of winning his or her case before an Administra-
tive Law Judge while claimants in Fort Smith, Arkansas had a 72.8%
chance.82 Although some variation based on geographical distribution
is expected because of the test for disability,83 these regional differences
are not sufficiently significant in the disability process to account for
the varying statistics among various cities. The variation may be due to
regional attitudes toward work and disability as well as differences be-
tween the standards actually used by persons deciding cases and the
standards that appear within the regulations and state manuals. De-
spite difficulties in drawing precise conclusions from these statistics,
taken together they demonstrate serious problems with consistency and
accuracy in the disability determination process.
2. The Use of Vocational Experts-Although lack of consistency
has been the major thrust of criticism against the disability evaluation
process, and properly so,' 4 the use of vocational experts also has come
under the proverbial gun. Vocational experts, who testify at the hear-
80. MASHAW, HEARINGS, supra note 12, at 21-24.
81. SUBCOMMITTEE ON SOCIAL SECURITY OF HOUSE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND
MEANS, 95TH CONG., 2ND SESS., DISABILITY ADJUDICATION STRUCTURE 113 (Comm. Print
1978) (Chart II).
82. Federal-State Relations and Quality Assurance Under the Disability Insurance Pro-
gram: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Social Security of the House Comm on Ways and
Means, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 96, 96-97 (1978).
83. For a determination that a claimant is not disabled, jobs that the claimant can per-
form must exist in the region where the claimant resides or in several regions of the country.
42 U.S.C. §423(d)(2)(A) (1976).
84. Perhaps no characteristic of a procedural system is so uniformly denounced as
a tendency to produce inconsistent results. When disposition depends more on
which judge is assigned to the case than on the facts or the legal rules, the tendency
is to describe the system as lawless, arbitrary, or the like even though case assign-
ment is random and petitioners have ex ante perfectly even chances with respect to
which judge they get.
MASHAW, HEARINGS, supra note 12, at 19.
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ings about the kind and number of jobs available for claimants with
certain physical and emotional restrictions, were used in over 87,000
hearings in 1978 at an approximate cost of four million dollars.8 5 A
report by the Office of the Inspector General found that the questioning
of vocational experts by Administrative Law Judges was improperly
handled. "As a result, some hearings were poorly documented, the po-
tential for inappropriate ALJ decisions existed, and full value was not
obtained from vocational experts in return for the annual four million
dollars spent by SSA for their expert fees." 6 One study concluded that
ALJ's may use vocational experts simply to substantiate a conclusion
the ALJ has already drawn.' The same study and others8 called for
experimentation with the use of administrative notice to replace testi-
mony by vocational experts in many situations. And, in one study
headed up by Jerry Mashaw, the authors concluded: "We also believe
that a sensitive use of official notice would eliminate substantial ex-
penditures for unnecessary testimony by vocational experts, and might,
in addition, increase the accuracy and fairness of the decision pro-
cess."8 9 The Medical-Vocational Guidelines were a response, in part,
to the criticisms that vocational expert testimony was not worth its cost
and often played a minimal role in the outcome of disability cases.90
85. Office of the Inspector General, Review of Vocational Expert Usage in the Hearings
and Appeals Process by the Social Security Administration (1980), cited in 2 SOCIAL SECUR-
rrY FORUM No. 9, at 5 (September, 1980).
86. Id. at 6.
87. Our observations and interviews suggest the possibility that not only may
ALJs choose vocational experts with whom they generally agree, but also some
vocational experts may mold their testimony to fit what they believe to be the
predilections of the ALJ before whom they are appearing. If this occurs, it is cer-
tainly not surprising. The vocational experts are well paid for their efforts and can
be excluded by the ALJs if they are thought to be unhelpful. Moreover, the ques-
tions they are asked are close judgment calls in any event, and it is easy and natu-
ral to shade one's judgment depending on the contexts. One ALJ said, "you can
get a vocational expert to say anything you want him to." Vocational experts who
were interviewed denied that this was the case.
MASHAW, HEARINGS, supra note 12, at 79.
88. Cf. R. DIXON, supra note 11, at 150 (calling for revision of manner of proof of exist-
ence of jobs).
89. MASHAW, HEARINGS, supra note 12, at xxiii.
90. Although courts and Administrative Law Judges have viewed the medical-voca-
tional regulations as a clear departure from former practice, HEW, in its summary of the
regulations, stated that "in publishing the amendments, the Social Security Administration
intends to consolidate and elaborate upon long standing medical vocational evaluation poli-
cies for adjudicating disability claims in which an individual's age, education, and work
experience must be considered in addition to the medical condition." 43 Fed. Reg. 55,349
(1978). Many state disability determination programs and the Bureau of Disability Insur-
ance have used, and continue to use, a form of these guidelines, but the guidelines are new at
the hearing and appeals stages. To test the Social Security Administration's assertion that
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B. The Purposes of the Medical- Vocational Guidelines
The regulations seek to advance several goals, some of which find
expression in the regulations themselves while others are implicit.
Chief among these goals are consistency, not only among claimants at
the same stage but also for claimants throughout the application and
appeals process, and understandability. The regulations state generally
that they "will provide information about the applicable rules and will
promote more equitable, consistent and understandable decisions."91
They also state that "consolidating these policies and incorporating
them into the regulations . . . will serve to better assure the soundness
and consistency of disability determinations in all claims that are filed
regardless of the level at which they are adjudicated .. *"92 The SSA
expected the regulations to "promote better understanding and accept-
ance by the public and the courts of disability determinations that are
made." 93 In addition to making the rules of decision-making and the
final decision itself more understandable to claimants and their repre-
sentatives, the SSA stated that the regulations "better serve to advise
the public, adjudicatory personnel within the Social Security Adminis-
tration, and the courts, [sic] of the specific rules followed by the Social
Security Administration."9 Finally, the introductory comments to the
regulations express the balance the rules attempt to achieve between
providing more uniform and definitive standards "while preserving the
individuality of the determination."9 " Another major, albeit implicit,
goal of the regulations is administrative efficiency through the use of
administrative presumptions and administrative notice. 96 More cir-
cumspect commentators have described the regulations as "designed to
the Medical-vocational Guidelines are simply an embodiment of long-standing policy, the
author requested documentary support from the administration under the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act. Documents obtained indicate that a "grid" system similar to the present guide-
Hes was in effect beginning in 1968. The system was used in cases in which the issue to be
decided was whether the claimant was capable of performing work other than his previous
employment. Traces of a system of categorical decision-making can be found in administra-
tion manuals written in 1963. How widely or consistently these policies were used since
their inception is not clear. They were not written with the clarity that characterizes the
current Medical-Vocational Guidelines. OASI Disability Insurance Letter No. 111-3 (Sep-
tember 20, 1963) (on file with author); Social Security Administration, Adudicative Guides
404.1502(b) - Ability To Do Other Work (September 20, 1968) (on file with author).
91. 43 Fed. Reg. 55,349, 55,355 (1978).
92. Id. at 55,349.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 55,351.
95. Id. at 55,362.
96. Holmes v. Harris, No. 79-0730-H, recommendation of magistrate, slip op. at 8-9
(S.D.Ala., Aug. 18, 1980).
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save time and money."97
IV. ACCURACY, CONSISTENCY, AND RELATED ISSUES
A preliminary inquiry is whether the Medical-Vocational Guide-
lines achieve or can be expected to achieve their purposes. In any sys-
tem of categorical decision-making, a strong attempt to achieve one
major jurisprudential goal of the system, such as consistency, inevitably
requires trade-offs and sacrifice in other features or values, such as ac-
curacy, efficiency, understandability of standards, and acceptance of
the system. This section of the article looks at some of the trade-offs
involved in promoting one of these major features over another in any
decision-making process. Both consistency and accuracy stand out
among these goals, but accuracy receives special attention because the
Supreme Court has focused repeatedly on it when analyzing the due
process aspects of procedural systems.98
To evaluate the system's ability to achieve consistency and accu-
racy, one first must determine the standard by which the system is to be
judged. Deciding on such a standard in the disability area is difficult,
however, and the standards that can be found suffer from various limi-
tations. The medical-vocational regulations base determinations of
disability on the factors of functional capacity, age, education, previous
work, and transferability of skills.99 The regulations' use of these voca-
tional factors is obviously appropriate and important because of their
inclusion in the statutory definition of disability. oo But one must look
beyond the vocational factors and residual functional capacity in judg-
ing the accuracy and consistency of the medical-vocational regulations
to avoid the circularity of evaluating the medical-vocational decision-
making process by its own definition of disability. For this reason, in
judging major jurisprudential features of the system, this article uses
the basic definition of disability in the statute and certain other factors
that are normally considered to be a part of disability.' 0 '
Despite the availability of a statutory definition of disability, accu-
97. Frady v. Harris, 646 F.2d 143, 145 (4th Cir. 1981) (Hall, J., dissenting).
98. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's due process jurisprudence, see MASHAW,
HEARINGS, supra note 12, at 8-1 I, 35; Mashaw, Due Process, supra note 73, at 37-46.
99. 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 2, §200.00 (1982).
100. 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(2)(A) (1976).
101. In judging major features of the Social Security system, one might look beyond the
statutory definition and factors usually considered to be a part of disability and analyze the
system from the perspective of the program's underlying purpose. Although this tack can be
helpful, discerning the program's underlying purpose is difficult. As mentioned, this article
will not examine the underlying purpose of the disability program in assessing the Medical-
Vocational Guidelines but rather the statutory definition of disability.
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racy is difficult to measure because there is no objective or empirical
test outside the disability process for determining whether a decision is
correct. Saad Nagi's clinical approach, 0 2 in which a team that in-
cluded doctors, vocational experts, and psychologists assessed the accu-
racy of disability determinations, provides the most helpful mode for
judging accuracy. But even this approach suffers from the want of an
objective external standard, and it is much too expensive and cumber-
some for general use. Regardless of the method used to measure accu-
racy, the factors used in determining disability and the process's
methodology must be examined to see if the system is capable of pro-
ducing accurate results.
A. The Problem of Over-generalization
The push for consistent decision-making in a categorical process
requires some generalization. The issue then becomes whether this
process produces, on balance, greater losses in accuracy than gains in
consistency. In disability decision-making, one must ask: as the system
approaches over-generalization, are cases being decided and classified
incorrectly that would most likely be decided correctly under the more
clinical approach that was used before the medical-vocational regula-
tions came into effect?' 0 3 Because of this tendency to over-generalize,
categorical decision-making has "been criticized as inappropriately
'fixed and mechanical' and insufficiently sensitive to individual differ-
ences."' The Medical-Vocational Guidelines also have been criti-
cized ' 5 and chaUenged"° as replacing individualized decision-making
with an "average man" concept.
1. Are Critical Factors Included?-Any decision-making process,
whether clinical or categorical, will be accurate only if the decision-
maker considers those features most relevant to the decision at hand.
In a categorical decision-making process, the system's designers have
predetermined which features will be dispositive. If the standard is a
very simple one, it obviously is easier for the decision-makers - under
102. See R. DIXON, supra note 11, at 65-73 (summarizing Nagi).
103. See Mashaw, Quality, supra note 12, at 829.
104. Underwood, supra note 13, at 1425.
105. J. Lyko, D. Sweeney, D. Carroll, Comments of the Administrative Law Center and
National Senior Citizens Law Center on Draft of "Rules For Adjudicating Disability
Claims in which Vocational Factors Must be Considered" 6 (December 8, 1976) (on file with
the Social Security Administration and the author).
106. See, e.g., Stallings v. Harris, 493 F. Supp. 956, 958 (W.D.Tenn. 1980) aJ'd sub nom.
Kirk v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 667 F.2d 524 (6th Cir. 1981); Cf. Santise v.
Harris, 501 F. Supp. 274, 276 (D.N.J. 1980), rev'd sub nom. Santise v. Schweiker, 676 F.2d
925 (3rd Cir. 1982).
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either a clinical or statistical/categorical method - to discover the rele-
vant features of the case. For example, if disability is defined as being
over the age of thirty, the dispositive feature of disability is age. Al-
though there may be the odd cases in which age is difficult to determine
because of the want of a birth certificate or an alleged error in birth
records, for most cases we have a standard that generally is both simple
and easy to apply. If the standard is simple, accuracy and consistency
will merge. That is, because standards are being applied correctly to
correctly found facts, like cases will be treated in a like manner. Addi-
tionally, a simple standard promotes predictability in decision-making.
In our example, an individual over the age of thirty will be able to
predict, as will his or her lawyer, that disability will be found. As the
standard becomes more complex, however, such as the statutory defini-
tion of disability which requires the assessment of numerous voca-
tional, medical, and psychological factors, the relevant factors become
more difficult to determine, and it becomes more difficult to approach
the ideal where accuracy and consistency merge. Under a complex
standard, seeking to assure consistency will produce inevitable trade-
offs in terms of limiting discretion, individualization, and individual
accuracy. A well-designed categorical decision-making process should
minimize these trade-offs and should offset them by gains in efficiency
and aggregate accuracy.
Although the medical-vocational regulations correctly focus on the
various vocational factors set out in the statutory definition of disabil-
ity, which include age, education, and prior work experience, 107 they
ignore completely one crucial factor: the individual's adjustment to his
or her disability. Scholars of the disability process and of vocational
rehabilitation have recognized the significance of this factor. For ex-
ample, Robert G. Dixon has stated that, in borderline cases, "the
claimant's personal 'set' in the relation to his handicaps is often really
the key factor. This is not specified in the statute, regulations, or disa-
bility insurance letters, but an observer at several hearings is immedi-
ately struck by its overwhelming nature."'' 0 8 Dixon goes on to say that:
The claimant's set regarding enduring pain, discomfort, and re-
stricted movement, regarding his willingness to try to learn a new
107. 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(2)(A) (1976).
108. R. DIXON, supra note 11, at 61. Dixon considers borderline cases to be those in
which no listed impairment has been found and which do not involve "'individuals with a
marginal education and long work experience (e.g., 35-40 years or more) limited to the per-
formance of arduous unskilled labor' who 'is not working and is no longer able to perform
such labor because of a significant impairment or impairments and, considering his age,
education, and vocational background is unable to engage in lighter work.'" Id. at 54-56
(quoting 20 C.F.R. §404.1502(c) (1972)).
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skill, regarding his willingness to adjust his life style to the need
for greater off-the-job rest, regarding his residual 'zip' in general
and especially his pride, are all relevant .... ,09
An individual's "set" also has been recognized by vocational rehabili-
tation specialists as most important in making a prognosis as to future
work capacity." The failure to account for this key factor, although
contributing to consistency because of the highly subjective nature of
this concept, seriously undermines the regulations' worth in accurately
assessing disability.
Although the regulations do allow the "grid" to be used simply as
a framework where non-exertional limitations exist, it is unlikely that
the mental impairments mentioned as one example of nonexertional
limitations are meant to include the factor of an individual's "set.""'
Both the regulations' failure to mention adjustment to disability, as
well as the medical-vocational regulations' function as a basic rule
rather than as a guideline to be used in the case of exceptions, support
this conclusion. Because adjustment is a major factor in most of the
cases that are governed by the Medical-Vocational Guidelines, and be-
cause the existence of a mental impairment is looked at as an exception
to the required conclusions of the regulations, the drafters of the regu-
lations probably did not intend to include this concept of adjustment
within their framework of decision-making.
In addition to not accounting for a claimant's adjustment to his or
her disability, the regulations fail to accommodate minor psychological
problems, as distinguished from psychiatric disorders of the magnitude
referred to in the regulations as mental impairments." 2 The regula-
tions further fail to recognize the strong link between physical
problems and emotional states and, outside of the basic "framework"
concept, make no accommodation for this factor." 13
A recent case upholding the validity of the regulations illustrates
their inadequate handling of nonexertional limitations such as minor
109. R. DIXON, supra note 11, at 61.
110. J. CULL & R. HARDY, UNDERSTANDING DISABILITY FOR SOCIAL AND REHABILITA-
TION SERVICES 98-103 (1973).
111. This failure to include the concept of adjustment seems to go against the require-
ment that cases be decided on an individualized basis. See infra notes 178-85 and accompa-
nying text.
112. The failure to consider adjustment also supports this view. See supra notes 108-111
and accompanying text. The same evidence discussed above concerning adjustment also
supports this view.
113. For examples of links between emotional and physical problems, see M. Friedman
& P. Bennet, Depression and Hypertension, 39 PSYCHOSOMATIC MEDICINE 134 (1977);




psychiatric and psychological problems. In Stallings v. Harris, 4 the
claimant was found not disabled despite severe symptoms. He suffered
from arthritis, low back pain after two back operations, high blood
pressure, nervousness, duodenitis (inflammation of the lower intestine),
diabetes, an enlarged liver, poor eyesight, and diarrhea. Records
showed that he had suffered two schizophrenic breakdowns, and other
psychiatric evidence included findings of "chronic undifferentiated type
schizophrenic reaction in partial remission,""' 5 a diagnosis of anxiety
neurosis with a prognosis that was "guarded, in view of the number of
somatic complaints and duration,"'" 6 and a statement by one doctor
"that the plaintiff was 'fairly convinced that he cannot return to work
and I doubt that anything is going to change this impression.' ""7 In
addition, the record described alcoholism and a rash caused by an anx-
iety reaction. Another doctor, however, reported that "I see no psychi-
atric reason why his activities should be significantly reduced.""' 8 This
last report may have provided the "substantial evidence" to support the
court's finding of not disabled. Considering the extent of the claimant's
emotional problems, this case suggests some courts may demand that
psychiatric and psychological impairments be substantial indeed before
such impairments become appropriate for consideration in decision-
making under the medical-vocational regulations.
In addition to the possibility of excluding a class of important fac-
tors, like adjustment, any categorical system is likely to overlook
unique characteristics in cases that appear similar but should be de-
cided differently because of some unusual feature." 9 By focusing on a
predetermined set of characteristics or categories, the system also may
prevent claimants from presenting evidence they regard as favorable by
restricting testimony to certain predetermined categories of injury.
Categorical decision-making thus not only suffers from the possibility
of inaccuracy but also creates a sense of unfairness in claimants who
may feel that they are unable to participate in the fashion they believe
to be important. 20
114. 493 F. Supp. 956 (W.D.Tenn. 1980), af'd sub nom. Kirk v. Secretary of Health and
Human Services, 667 F.2d 524 (6th Cir. 1981).
115. 493 F. Supp. at 962.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 961.
118. Id. at 962.
119. "The eye sees in things what it looks for, and it looks for what is already in the
mind." G. BELLOW & B. MOULTON, THE LAWYERING PROCESS 296 (1978) (Motto of
Michael Demiashkevitch, adopted by the School of Scientific Police in Paris).
120. See Joint Anti-Facist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171-72 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring); Verkuil, The Emerging Concept ofAdministraive Procedure, 78
COLUM. L. REV. 258, 279-80 (1978).
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Any categorical decision-making process therefore should include
those factors necessary to a correct decision under the proper standard,
and should not prevent the important characteristics of individual cases
from being considered. In addition, those categorical factors that are
used should accurately reflect or interpret the information they catego-
rize and should not be overly generalized themselves. The categorical
factors of age, education, and transferability of work skills in the medi-
cal-vocational regulations all have been criticized as being overly gen-
eralized and not accurately reflecting real facts.
2. Are Included Factors Workable?
a. Age-Age, as defined in the regulations, reflects the conven-
tional wisdom that younger workers are generally better able to adjust
to physical problems than their seniors because of their supposed
greater ability to learn new skills and to adapt to new work settings.
Although this assumption seems to work as a gross reflection of how
the aging process affects workers, there are serious questions about its
usefulness as a factor in deciding individual cases. As one commenta-
tor observed, "[t]he typical response of vocational expert witnesses was
that while older workers are generally less adaptable to change than
younger workers, it is virtually impossible to apply that generalization
to specific situations; moreover, .if necessity requires, most individuals
will adapt to new situations and new jobs."'' The Social Security Ad-
ministration concedes that "there are no conclusive data which relate
varying specific chronological ages to specific physiologically-based vo-
cational limitations for performing jobs ... 122 Some advocates of
the system, even though troubled by the inaccuracy that can result in
individual cases, have justified the system by saying that it creates a
certain rough justice in recognizing the effects of the aging process and,
although arbitrary distinctions may result, the system is the only feasi-
ble way of recognizing the proposition that aging affects adaptabil-
ity.'2 3 Others, however, even though convinced of this assumption and
of the possibility of drawing roughly accurate lines to reflect the effects
of the aging process have come to question this line-drawing as they
themselves grow older. 124 Additional empirical study needs to be done
121. Goldhammer, The Effect of New Vocational Regulations on Social Security and Sup-
plemental Security Income Disability Claims, 32 AD. L. REv. 501, 508 (1980).
122. 43 Fed. Reg. 55,349, 55,359 (1978).
123. Goldhammer, supra note 121, at 508.
124. One of the funniest things that happened in a long time - I guess it was 1960
or whenever the age fifty limitation for cash payments was repealed - was mem-
bers of the Ways and Means Committee sort of looking at each other and saying,
"Well, there's no logic to age fifty. Whatever made anyone think that that had any
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to discern whether this "rough justice" produces better decision-mak-
ing and, within acceptable limits, accurately reflects the effect of age on
an individual's ability to work in new settings and positions.
Another criticism of the age factor has been that insignificant dif-
ferences in age create dramatic differences in outcome. If cases that
might have been decided either way prior to the medical-vocational
regulations are now decided one specific way because of the regula-
tions, this over-generalization creates no significant problem. 2 - It
seems more likely, however, that decisions now turn on the factor of
age, and outcomes are significantly different now than they were before
the medical-vocational regulations took effect. Older individuals will
fare much better under the Medical-Vocational Guidelines than
younger workers, for whom disability will be virtually impossible to
establish. Regardless of the category of work into which a claimant's
residual functional capacity falls, the claimant in every case will have a
better chance of collecting benefits if he or she is of "advanced age" or
"closely approaching advanced age."' 26 In only one category - Sed-
entary Work - does the table give an individual in the 39-to-45-year-
old age range a chance of being found disabled.
127
Examination of the age factor suggests that a danger may be inher-
ent in all categorical decision-making systems: they create an almost
irresistable temptation to apply their criteria mechanically, as a means
to find easy answers to hard questions. Although the regulations cau-
tion that flexibility should be used in their application 2 ' and that age
may not be important in specific cases, 129 it is likely that these caveats
will go unheeded in many cases because the "grid" seems to offer a
basic formula to determine disability - a prospect too appealing to
turn down. Although there has been little empirical research into how
fact-finders decide cases, the basic strategy of both appellate and trial
attorneys has been to develop simple theories that can be easily con-
sense to it?" When we recall that some of those very same members just a couple
of years earlier had been accepting very logical rationalizations that people are
giving them as to why you're much less likely to be rehabilitated after fifty and why
it was a much more logical approach to at least go that far if you weren't going to
meet the cost of going all the way.
M. DERTHICK, upra note 68, at 314, (quoting Interview with Arthur E. Hess, 41-42 (Oral
History Collection, Columbia University)) (1966).
125. Mashaw, Quality, upra note 12, at 829.
126. See 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 2, Tables 1, 2, 3 (1982).
127. Id
128. "Ages 45, 50, 55 and 60 are intended as specific indicators but are not intended to be
applied mechanically in borderline situations .... " 43 Fed. Reg. 55,349, 55,359 (1978).
129. "This designation of age is an expectation only and not an arbitrary limit and may
not be crucial in a particular case." 43 Fed. Reg. 55,349, 55,354 (1978).
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veyed and readily understood. The underlying rationale for this strat-
egy is that simple concepts are more easily grasped, more easily dealt
with, and more likely to be used in decision-making than complicated
ones. Accordingly, rather than deciding the issue of disability based on
more complex and primarily subjective issues such as one's ability to
adapt to a new work setting or the effect of a particular physical im-
pairment, the fact-finder will apply the simple and easily discernible
fact of the claimant's age in a mechanical fashion, giving it unwar-
ranted significance.
The Appeals Council's decision in a case shortly after the guide-
lines went into effect illustrates this process. In Freeman v. Harris,30
the court remanded a claimant's case for an additional hearing before
an Administrative Law Judge. At the first hearing, the Administrative
Law Judge had found that the claimant's physical problems, his pain,
and the drowsiness caused by medication caused him to be disabled in
1975. The Appeals Council modified this decision and found that disa-
bility began on September 3, 1977, the date of the claimant's 55th birth-
day. Although the court refused to permit the Medical-Vocational
Guidelines to be applied retroactively to a claimant's detriment, the
case suggests that even at the Appeals Council - the highest level
within the Social Security Disability system - age will become a
strong determining factor and will result in decisions that have the ap-
pearance of being overly generalized. 13'
b. Education-The regulations' treatment of education's effect on
disability is another over-generalized area having the potential for cre-
ating arbitrary decisions. The regulations do reflect the generally accu-
rate proposition that employability increases with additional education,
but they create rather vague, ill-defined categories of educational level
that may not be valid in determining the outcome in individual cases.
The regulations divide educational levels into four categories: illiterate
and unable to communicate in English, limited education and at least
able to communicate in English, limited education or less, and high
school graduate or more. The category of high school graduate is di-
vided into education which provides for direct entry into skilled work
and that which does not.
The regulations allow the educational factor to be used more flex-
ibly than the general grid-like structure of the Medical-Vocational
130. 1 SOCIAL SECURITY FORUM No. 6, at 7 (1979), citing Freeman v. Harris, No. 76-A-
1648-M (N.D.Ala. October 3, 1979).




Guidelines would indicate. For example, the regulations state that lack
of formal schooling is not necessarily proof that the individual is uned-
ucated or lacks such capacities. 32 Additionally, prior work experience
and daily activities such as hobbies may indicate higher capacities than
an individual's formal education might suggest.' 33 Conversely, the reg-
ulations also note that formal education that was completed many
years before the beginning of an impairment may no longer be useful
in determining work ability. 134 Although far more flexibility is called
for in applying the educational factor than in the application of age,
claims examiners, Administrative Law Judges, and the Appeals Coun-
cil are likely to consider a person's formal educational level without a
thorough inquiry into the claimant's real educational skills. The regu-
lations are likely to be applied in a mechanical fashion, and the arbi-
trary limits they set probably will lead to inaccurate decisions.
c. Transferability of Skills-The transferability of skills factor is
especially problematic because it compounds the problems of over-gen-
eralization with an additional difficulty: the factor itself is difficult to
determine. Unlike the simple fact of age and the somewhat more com-
plex education factor, transferability involves a very difficult determi-
nation of whether the claimant's skills are transferable to a wide range
of jobs that exist in significant numbers for a given functional capacity,
or to only a few jobs or categories within that functional capacity
range. 135 The complexity of these issues makes it very likely that in-
consistent and inaccurate determinations will be made. Additionally,
the regulations assume that skills are less transferable as age increases
and, for certain age categories, drop the transferability inquiry com-
pletely. The transferability factor thus incorporates the age factor's po-
tential for inaccuracy described above. Finally, like age and education,
transferability provides overworked or lazy deciders with tests that
promise easy answers to difficult questions.
The structure of the age, education, and transferability categories
in the medical-vocational regulations is likely to cause problems of in-
accurate determinations. Additional inaccuracy is likely to be gener-
ated because the effects of these factors, especially that of age upon
transferability, are of questionable validity. In addition, decision-mak-
ers likely will use the factors with greater rigidity than the guidelines
require. These problems, combined with the guidelines' failure to take
132. 20 C.F.R. §404.1564(a) (1982).
133. Id.
134. 20 C.F.R. §404.1564(b) (1982).
135. J. Lyko, D. Sweeney, and D. Carroll, supra note 105, at 44.
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into account certain critical factors, especially a claimant's "set," results
in an over-generalized handling of cases.
B. The Mix of Rules and Discretion
As pointed out earlier, a major goal in the adoption of the Medi-
cal-Vocational Guidelines was to increase consistency in an adminis-
trative process heavily criticized for its inconsistency. Generally, one
method for increasing consistency - applied extensively in the "grid"
- is to curb discretion. Although consistency is the treatment of like
cases in a like fashion, one needs to decide what makes cases similar.
The Medical-Vocational Guidelines channel discretion when dealing
with the factors of age, education, and work experience. Consistency, if
judged on the basis of these vocational factors, is likely to be increased.
But, the more important standard for judging consistency is that of the
statutory standard of disability, and consistency merges with accuracy
when the disability statute becomes the standard against which it is
judged. But consistency judged by the statutory standard of disability
is unlikely to be achieved despite the costs that have been incurred in
adopting the Medical-Vocational Guidelines.
First, the Medical-Vocational Guidelines limit discretion during
the final stage of the decision-making process, which is too late in the
process to improve consistency greatly. That is, the rules limit discre-
tion when the decider is applying the already determined factors of age,
education, etc. (in cases where no nonexertional limitations have been
found), but decision-makers can exercise great discretion in developing
the subordinate facts that make up the vocational factors.
Second, the system allows great discretion in making decisions
about the individual's "residual functional capacity," i.e., whether the
individual is able to do sedentary, light, medium, or heavy work. Like
the vocational factors, this issue of capacity must be decided before one
uses the "grid" which limits discretion and requires certain disability
findings. "[A]nd it is usually that capacity [residual functional capac-
ity] which is the determinative issue in a disability case."' 13 6
The decision on physical capacity, which takes into account a wide
range of medical information, testimony from the claimant, and testi-
mony from any witnesses the claimant calls, is a highly judgmental and
subjective determination. Yet the "grid" provides no guidance at this
juncture. An accurate determination of this major and dispositive fac-
tor would create more consistent decision-making in the disability de-
termination process.
136. Goldhammer, supra note 121, at 509.
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Consistency can be hampered further by fact-finders who disagree
with the disability determinations required by the varying vocational
factors found in the "grid" and manipulate the functional capacity
findings to achieve results with which they agree. This practice is simi-
lar to that followed by Administrative Law Judges who were faced with
vocational testimony requiring outcomes with which they did not
agree. 137 Although manipulation of outcomes is possible in any delib-
erative process, the problem is more troubling in categorical systems
like the Medical-Vocational Guidelines where decision-makers can
hide their manipulation and bias behind a system which initially ap-
pears to have greater impartiality and precision.
Another potential source of inconsistency is the regulation's han-
dling of the transferability factor. As the prefatory materials to the
guidelines acknowledge, "while understanding of skills and the basis of
transferability can be obtained from Volume II of the DOT and the
lists of occupations in 'Selected Characteristics of Occupations By
Worker Traits and Physical Strength, Supplement 2 to the Dictionary
of Occupational Titles, Third Edition', this remains a judgmental
area .138
These examples of how consistency may not be achieved under the
Medical-Vocational Guidelines illustrate the complex mix of rules and
discretion that exists in disability determinations. "The unthinking as-
sumption that an officer either follows a rule or exercises discretion is
false, because rules overlap with discretion in many ways.'1 39 The par-
ticular mix of discretion in the Medical-Vocational Guidelines, which
allows great variation in the initial stages in the disability determina-
tion process and channels discretion later in the process, demonstrates
why consistency is unlikely to be dramatically increased when one uses
the statutory definition of disability as a yardstick for consistency. This
analysis of the mix between discretion and rules reveals the theoretical
problems that exist in the Medical-Vocational Guidelines' attempt to
promote consistency. Much empirical work needs to be done on this
issue, but studies of the state programs which, according to the Social
Security Administration, used a form of the Medical-Vocational
Guidelines before its appearance in the Federal Register, have criti-
137. MASHAW, HEARINGS, supra note 12, at 78. The dangers of manipulation in categori-
cal judicial decision-making have been expounded in other areas. Cf. R. WEINTRAUB, COM-
MENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS at 48-89 (2nd ed. 1980) (incorrect initial classification
of substantive problem determines choice of law).
138. 43 Fed. Reg. 55,349, 55,361 (1978) (emphasis added).
139. 2 K. DAVIs, supra note 68, §8:7, at 186.
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cized the states for their inconsistent decisions.1°
C. The Escape Clause Concept
Although the Medical-Vocational Guidelines create irrebuttable
adjudicative rules, 141 the regulations contain, both implicitly and ex-
plicitly, certain escape devices. The discretion allowed in finding adju-
dicative facts which are to be plugged into the "grid" implicitly
provides flexibility in the disability determination. Explicit provisions
in the regulations provide an escape by allowing the guidelines to be
used as a "framework" for decision-making where nonexertional fac-
tors exist. ' 42 Although the regulations do not contain an exhaustive list
of nonexertional limitations, they do cite mental, sensory, and skin im-
pairments as examples. When assessing mental disorders, the Social
Security Administration looks at factors such as "ability to understand,
to carry out and remember instructions, and to respond appropriately
to supervision, co-workers and work pressures in a work setting. "143
When a claimant has other nonexertional impairments and an impair-
ment which affects physical exertion, the decision-maker "must con-
sider both in deciding [the claimant's] residual functional capacity."' 144
This escape clause concept explicitly changes the governing rules of the
regulations into guiding rules,' 45 and thus preserves some discretion. It
also allows for some needed individualization in determining
disability.
Although the designers of the regulations should be commended
for allowing individualization through this escape clause for nonexer-
tional impairments, the "framework" concept is unlikely to increase ac-
curacy substantially because its use is likely to be severely limited,
especially at the initial determination and reconsideration stages. First,
some degree of nonexertional impairment, usually emotional, exists in
140. REPORT OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE UNITED STATES, THE SOCIAL SECURITY AD-
MINISTRATION SHOULD PROVIDE MORE MANAGEMENT AND LEADERSHIP IN DETERMINING
WHO IS ELIGIBLE FOR DISABILITY BENEFITS, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SOCIAL SECURITY OF THE
COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, 94TH CONG., 2ND SESS., (Comm. Print on H.R. 15630,
1976).
141. "[T]he distinction should be made between adjudicative facts, which can be rebut-
ted, and the adjudicatory rule to be applied to these facts, which is conclusive." 43 Fed.
Reg. 55,349, 55,361 (1978).
142. 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 2, §200.00(e)(2) (1982).
143. 20 C.F.R. §402.1545(c) (1982).
144. 20 C.F.R. §404.1545(d) (1982).
'145. For some basic propositions about rules and discretion, see 2 K. DAVIS, supra note
68, §8:7, at 183-92.
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most disability cases. 14 6 If nonexertional impairments and the frame-
work concept are taken seriously, given the number of situations in
which the "grid" is to be used as a framework rather than conclusively,
the exceptions to the rule may outnumber the situations in which the
categorical rule itself applies. Because of the nonexertional impair-
ments stature as an exception, fact-finders are likely to avoid applying
the escape clause concept even when its application is warranted. Sec-
ond, the escape clause is both less obvious and more difficult to com-
prehend than the tables which make up the "grid." Hence, most fact-
finders will use the "grid" as often as possible to simplify their work
and to avoid both criticism from supervisors and reversals by higher
level adjudicators in the Social Security Administration. Stalings v.
Harris, discussed earlier, 47 supports the view that the escape clause is
unlikely to be applied when appropriate.
D. The Problem of Vocational Testimony
Another major goal of the regulations is to eliminate problems
with vocational testimony. One of the problems with vocational testi-
mony has been that experts' opinions differ, creating some inconsis-
tency in the Social Security decisions. For example, in a case
concerning an individual restricted to sedentary work because of a
back impairment, one expert might testify that the claimant could per-
form a significant number of entry-level unskilled jobs. Another might
disagree with that conclusion because of the individual's lack of famili-
arity with sedentary settings. To a degree, this particular form of in-
consistency is eliminated by the Medical-Vocational Guidelines by
limiting the number of situations in which vocational testimony is
needed. 1
48
The SSA also expected to cut costs by eliminating the need for
vocational experts in most cases where they were previously used.
Louis Zinn, the Vocational Consultant Program Administrator, ex-
pressed his opinion in a memorandum to vocational experts that their
testimony would be used only on the issues of transferability and per-
haps on the classification of past work into categories such as unskilled,
semi-skilled, etc. He stated: "[Y]our testimony will be directed to these
matters only, and you must refrain from offering testimony which con-
flicts with a conclusion stated in the rules."' 149 Others expected the
146. R. DIXON, supra note 11, at 80 (citing Social Security Administration Operations
Research Staff, Evaluation, Progress Report (M. Rock and F. Ichniowsky) 3, 19 (1967)).
147. See supra text accompanying notes 114-18.
148. Goldhammer, supra note 121, at 505.
149. Memorandum of Louis Zinn, Vocational Consultant Program Administrator, Bu-
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need for vocational testimony to be virtually eliminated by the Medi-
cal-Vocational Guidelines.
These goals are unlikely to be realized. The regulations plainly
still contain many areas where vocational testimony is necessary. Be-
cause the testimony is costly and experts will differ, to the degree that
this testimony is required, both the goals of economic efficiency and
consistency are undermined. If the vocational testimony is properly
used, however, and allows for more expert consideration of complex
areas, individual accuracy may be increased. But this increase in accu-
racy and any correlated increase in consistency will occur only if the
Medical-Vocational Guidelines are generally well constructed for mak-
ing disability determinations and the assistance of vocational experts in
classifying work aids in fine-tuning an already well-constructed
machine.
As pointed out in Zinn's memorandum, transferability is an area
that will continue to require the testimony of vocational experts. The
regulations give some guidance on the issue of transferability 5 ° but
continue to rely heavily on the vocational expert. For example, one
section states that:
The presence of acquired skills that are readily transferable to a
significant range of skilled work within an individual's residual
functional capacity would ordinarily warrant a finding of ability to
engage in substantial gainful activity regardless of the adversity of
age, or whether the individual's formal education is commensurate
with his or her demonstrated skill level.' 51
Although the regulation gives guidance, it leaves open the issue of
whether a person's skills are "readily transferable" and whether the in-
dividual's formal education is "commensurate with demonstrated skill
level." These issues, which many ALJ's will feel capable of resolving,
require the expertise of vocational experts.
A similar area requiring vocational expertise is the classification of
past employment into one of two categories: 1) semi-skilled or skilled
work, or 2) unskilled or none. This step is absolutely required in using
the "grid."'' 52 Although some past work is easily classified by Adminis-
trative Law Judges and other fact-finders in the Social Security Admin-
istration, many forms of work require classification by a vocational
expert. Fact-finders should look not only at the title of the job that was
reau of Hearings & Appeals, Social Security Administration, at 2 (January 16, 1979) (on file
with author).
150. See, e.g., 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 2, §201.00(e)-(h) (1982).
151. 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 2, §201.00(e) (1982).
152. See 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 2, Tables 1, 2, 3 (1982).
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performed but also at the specific skills that were used. In individual
cases, if an ALJ does not fully explore the skills of a particular job or
classify the level of work without calling a vocational expert, who can
state specifically for the record the reasons for the classification of prior
work, he or she will risk reversal.' 53
In many instances where residual functional capacity, age, and
previous work experience are not determinative, the disability determi-
nation turns on whether or not the individual's education provides for
direct entry into skilled work, 5 4 another area that often requires voca-
tional testimony. The complexity of this area is demonstrated by the
manner in which the regulations deal with education as a vocational
factor. 55 The regulations point out that education may not be demon-
strated simply by examining formal schooling because past work expe-
rience, daily activities, hobbies, or the results of testing may show
capacities that exceed those expected if one considers only formal
schooling. The regulations themselves thus recognize the complexity
that the tables ignore, further evidencing the difficult vocational judg-
ments that may need to be made in what appear to be rather ordinary
disability claims.
As discussed earlier, in cases where claimants have nonexertional
impairments or are unable to perform a full range of work within a
specific physical category, the Medical-Vocational Guidelines "provide
a framework for consideration of how much the individual's work ca-
pability is further diminished in terms of any types of jobs that would
be contraindicated by the nonexertional limitations." 156 Although the
regulations do state that full consideration must be given to all the rele-
vant facts and that examiners must look through the definitions and
discussions of the factors found earlier in the regulations,'57 they pro-
vide little guidance on how this framework concept is to be used in a
wide range of individual cases. Because of this lack of guidance, it
seems that the existence of nonexertional factors requires the assistance
of vocational experts to give accuracy to the disability determinations
in all but the fairly obvious cases.
153. See O'Banner v. Secretary of HEW, 587 F.2d 321, 323 (6th Cir. 1978); Garrett v.
Richardson, 471 F.2d 598, 603-04 (8th Cir. 1972); Henninger v. Celebreeze, 349 F.2d 808,
817-19 (6th Cir. 1965). See also Goffv. Harris, 502 F. Supp. 1086, 1091 (D.Va. 1980); Wil-
son v. Harris, 496 F. Supp. 746, 747-48 (D.Wis. 1980).
154. Compare 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 2, Table 1, Rule 201.06 (1982) (educa-
tion does not provide for direct entry into skilled work: finding, disabled) with Rule 201.08
(1982) (education provides for direct entry into skilled work: finding, not disabled).
155. See 20 C.F.R. §404.1564 (1982) (DI); 20 C.F.R. §416.964 (1982) (SSI).
156. 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 2, §200.00(e)(2) (1982).
157. See 20 C.F.R. §§404.1520 - 404.1569 (1982).
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Because of the complex fact patterns found in most disability cases
and the failure of the Medical-Vocational Guidelines to deal effectively
with cases that have in them factors other than exertional limitations, a
strong need for vocational testimony remains. In fact, the case law
seems to be recognizing this complexity and to be moving to limit the
kinds of cases that can be decided without vocational testimony.' 58 To
the degree that this need is met, the goal of consistency which the SSA
sought to achieve by replacing the possibly varying opinions of experts
with rules is undermined. Despite this need and its judicial recogni-
tion, vocational experts are unlikely to be called in the wide range of
cases in which their testimony would be not only helpful but also nec-
essary. This is caused in part by the Social Security Administration's
expectation that the Medical-Vocational Guidelines largely would
eliminate the need for vocational testimony. Undoubtedly, the cost of
calling vocational experts and the failure of Administrative Law Judges
to explore fully the complex facts in individual cases also will be rea-
sons for limited vocational testimony. By failing to call vocational ex-
perts, AL's will be involved in vocational judgments that they are
completely unqualified to make. This will undoubtedly cause inaccu-
rate individual determinations. It remains to be seen if aggregate accu-
racy will be lower than pre-Medical-Vocational Guidelines levels, and
whether losses in accuracy will be offset by any gain in consistency and
economic efficiency.
E. A Fair and Understandable Process
In addition to the goal of consistency in decision-making, the
Medical-Vocational Guidelines espouse goals of making "clearer to
claimants and their representatives how disability is determined where
vocational factors must be considered" and "promot[ing] better under-
standing and acceptance by the public and the courts of disability de-
terminations that are made."' 59  It is laudable for any adjudicative
158. See, e.g., Freeman v. Harris, 509 F. Supp. 96, 102-03 (D.S.C. 1981). Of special inter-
est on the issue of the need for vocational testimony is the recent case of Hall v. Harris, 658
F.2d 260, 267 (4th Cir. 1981). Although the court had recognized in an earlier case, Frady v.
Harris, 646 F.2d 143, 145 (4th Cir. 1981), the ability of the SSA to make disability determi-
nations based on the tables in the Medical-Vocational Guidelines, in Hall the court noted
that the ALJ failed to make findings on the skills required in the claimant's past work, the
transferability of those skills, whether the past work was semi-skilled or skilled, and whether
the claimant was capable of performing a full range of sedentary skills. Because of these
issues, the court suggested that "if upon remand a vocational expert's testimony is received
on the question whether claimant is able to perform specific alterative jobs available in the
national economy," any uncertainty whether the grid could be used to direct conclusions of
non-disability would be avoided. Hall v. Harris, 658 F.2d at 268.
159. 43 Fed. Reg. 55,349 (1978).
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system to make its determination process and standards understanda-
ble and acceptable to those affected by it.' 60 But anyone who is famil-
iar with the workings of the Medical-Vocational Guidelines, let alone
the basic Social Security disability determinations process, and who has
some understanding of the claimant's role within the system, would be
hard-pressed to imagine that the system has become more understand-
able to more than a handful of claimants. Claimants obtain their un-
derstanding of disability from the common-sense meaning of the word.
Most believe that if they cannot find work because of medical impair-
ments, they are disabled. In short, they believe that if there is no rea-
sonable possibility of their being employed, they are entitled to Social
Security disability. It defies their understanding to hear that they can
be denied benefits because of their theoretical ability to do a job for
which they would never be hired and for which there may be no
openings. 16
1
The claimant's common-sense understanding of disability is anti-
thetical to the statutory definition. This is especially true for persons
who have worked and contributed to the Social Security fund and are
applying for Title II benefits. They have paid into the fund for years,
have heard television advertisements extolling their ability to rely on
Social Security, and have developed a strong faith in the system of gov-
ernment benefits; they are incredulous when they discover the difficul-
ties they face in obtaining Disability Insurance Benefits. Claimants
need to be educated in how the statute and the guidelines define disa-
bility. This might be done through informative advertising, claimants'
contacts with claims examiners, and employers who withhold Social
Security taxes. But the promulgation of regulations, especially those
with the specificity and complexity of the Medical-Vocational Guide-
lines, is an extraordinarily unlikely route to raise claimants' under-
standing of the disability process.
160. See L. FULLER, supra note 9, at 63-65.
161. 20 C.F.R. Part 404.1566(c)(1982) states,
Inability to obtain work. We will determine that you are not disabled if your residual
functional capacity and vocational abilities make it possible for you to do work which
exists in the national economy, but you remain unemployed because of
(1) Your inability to get work;
(2) Lack of work in your local area;
(3) The hiring practices of employers;
(4) Technological changes in the industry in which you have worked;
(5) Cyclical economic conditions;
(6) No job openings for you;
(7) You would not actually be hired to do work you could otherwise do; or




Even if achieved through regulations or some educational process,
understanding is very different from acceptance. "By acceptability of
the decision process we mean its perceived fairness."' 62 A claimant's
perception of fairness of the disability process, like his or her under-
standing, is likely to come from common sense and experience. Claim-
ants' perceptions of fairness 6 3 are based on their knowledge of and
comparison to other claimants' situations as well as other factors such
as their treatment by Social Security personnel, including Administra-
tive Law Judges. 6" Although perceived fairness, at least to the degree
it is affected by the relationship between claimants and personnel of the
Social Security Administration, may be increased by the efficient and
courteous handling of claims and inquiries, it is unlikely that much,
aside from the effect of more accurate decision-making, can be done to
increase the perception of fairness based on the limited sample of cases
claimants are familiar with and their probably minimal familiarity with
the facts of those claims.
In any event, it seems unlikely that acceptance of the disability
process will be improved through the promulgation and use of the
Medical-Vocational Guidelines. It is unlikely that the claimant who
has heard a vocational expert testify that he can perform certain jobs
for which he knows he will never be hired will perceive the process as
fair. By concealing from the claimant this process of determining
whether the jobs he can perform exist in significant numbers - which
is the situation for unrepresented claimants in cases where the Medical-
Vocational Guidelines are applied - perceived fairness of the process
might be increased. But mystifying, hiding, and lessening a claimant's
understanding of the disability process are, at the least, extraordinarily
questionable methods for increasing perceived fairness.
An important element of both understandability and acceptability
is predictability: surprise outcomes create confusion and give the im-
pression of arbitrariness. The regulations, at least to the extent that
they state specific procedures to be followed and a set of rules to be
used in determining disability, certainly make the procedures more
162. "This [acceptability of the decision process] is an extremely slippery notion. It is
confusing in part because there are a number of different perspectives from which to view
fairness - the claimants, the Congress, the legal profession, the society as a whole."
MASHAW, HEARINGS, supra note 12, at xxiii.
163. This opinion of clients' perceptions of fairness comes from discussions with a limited
number of claimants and conjecture about how other claimants perceive the system.
164. This concept of "fairness" is distinct from the concepts of fairness embodied in pro-
cedural due process and the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§551-59, 701-06, 3105,
3344, 5371, 7521 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). See also 5 U.S.C. §556(e) (1977); Holmes v. Harris,
No. 79-0730-H, recommendation of magistrate, slip op. at 14-15, (S.D.Ala. Aug. 18, 1980).
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concrete and clearer to a claimant's representative. 65 They do little,
however, to make case outcomes more predictable.
At the extremes of the regulations, in cases where most or all fac-
tors point to or away from a determination of disability, prediction is
easy. For example, where an individual is limited to sedentary work, is
quite old, has a limited education, and has no transferable skills, the
outcome is easily predicted. But cases of this nature are the unusual
ones, and advocates had the ability to predict the outcome of these
cases before the promulgation of the Medical-Vocational Guidelines.
Prediction seems to be only marginally aided by the guidelines.
One advantage of the promulgation of the Medical-Vocational
Guidelines for advocates - and consequently a disadvantage for un-
represented claimants - is that the guidelines have created a number
of interesting lawyering issues. These issues have arisen not only in
cases challenging the regulations but also in the most routine of claims.
The advocate, in cases not resolved by the listing of impairments, ac-
cumulates evidence to show that various medical and vocational factors
fit his client on a line of the "grid" that requires a finding of disabled.
Where this approach is unlikely to reach a favorable result, the advo-
cate works at finding and developing facts that require the tables in the
guidelines to be used only as a framework for deciding the case or that
take the case completely outside the guidelines. Although the guide-
lines provide strategy options to a claimant's representative, this need
for sound lawyering could aggravate the disparity in outcomes between
represented and unrepresented claimants under the guidelines. Thus,
,although the Medical-Vocational Guidelines make the disability pro-
cess more understandable to claimants' representatives, they do little to
achieve the espoused goals of making the process more understandable
to claimants and promoting "better understanding and acceptance by
the public and the courts of the disability determinations that are
made."1 6
6
V. CASE CHALLENGES TO THE MEDICAL-VOCATIONAL GUIDELINES
Claimants and their advocates have challenged the Medical-Voca-
tional Guidelines on a number of theories. This section, by no means
an exhaustive discussion of the challenges made and cases in the area,
165. The proposition that the process is clearer to representatives because of the regula-
tions assumes that representatives will be diligent enough to search out and work through
these difficult regulations. My observations of hearings and those of my students lead me to
believe that large numbers of representatives are ill prepared in their cases, and, among
other things, have not considered how the Medical-Vocational Guidelines apply.
166. 43 Fed. Reg. 55,349 (1978).
[VOL. 42
ACCURACY AND CONSISTENCY
gives the reader an overview of the basic arguments advocates have
used and some of the ways these arguments have been handled by the
federal courts.
Advocates have most frequently argued that the Medical-Voca-
tional Guidelines establish a system for adjudication that is at variance
with the applicable statutes, decisions, and the Constitution. The regu-
lations have been upheld in almost all the circuits;' 67 but two circuits,
the second and the eleventh, have severely limited the use of the regu-
lations. 6 8 The fact that the regulations have been upheld by some
courts, struck down by others, and allowed only as a means of granting
benefits in still others, may result in the replacement of previous incon-
sistencies in decision-making with new ones based on a circuit's accept-
ance or rejection of the Medical-Vocational Guidelines. 69  This
inconsistency among circuits is likely to be remedied by the Supreme
Court's upcoming decision in Schweiker v. Campbell,7 ° which presents
the question of whether the SSA may rely on the guidelines rather than
individualized proof that a claimant is able to perform substantial gain-
ful activity.
One major thrust of arguments challenging the medical-vocational
regulations is that they improperly use administrative notice. Professor
Davis has described the balance that must be struck between the effi-
ciency of notice and the fairness of individualized proof as follows:
the basic principle is that extra record facts should be assumed
whenever assuming them is convenient but that convenience
should always yield to the requirement that parties should have
opportunity to meet in an appropriate fashion all facts that influ-
ence the disposition of the case. 1
167. Torres v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 677 F.2d 167, 169 (1st Cir. 1982);
Santise v. Schweiker, 676 F.2d 925, 935 (3rd Cir. 1982); Rivers v. Schweiker, 684 F.2d
1144, 1155 (5th Cir. 1982); Kirk v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 667 F.2d 524,
530-32 (6th Cir. 1981); Commins v. Schweiker, 670 F.2d 81, 83 (7th Cir. 1982); McCoy v.
Schweiker, 683 F.2d 1138, 1141 (8th Cir. 1982); Frady v. Harris, 646 F.2d 143, 145 (4th Cir.
1981).
168. See, e.g., Campbell v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 665 F.2d 48, 53-54
(2d Cir. 1981), cert. granted sub non Schweiker v. Campbell, 102 S.Ct. 2956 (1982); Broz v.
Schweiker, 677 F.2d 1351, 1359-61 (11th Cir. 1982).
169. For those who believe the regulations simply are the embodiment of long-standing
Social Security policy or a more accurate and consistent method for making decisions in
disability claims, the lack of uniform application of the regulations in various circuits may
not create great problems. For those who believe the regulations created a substantial
change in the disabilty determination process, however, the realization that claimants in one
circuit will be treated very differently from those in another is more troublesome.
170. Campbell v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 665 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1981),
cert. granted sub nom. Schweiker v. Campbell, 102 S.Ct. 2956 (1982).
171. 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, §15.17, at 198 (1980).
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The regulations plainly make wide use of administrative notice. Ad-
ministrative notice is taken of: various definitions and data, for exam-
ple, the requirements of sedentary work; of specific facts, such as the
effect age has upon the transferability of acquired work skills; and
more conclusively, of the disability or nondisability of people with cer-
tain physical capacities and vocational characteristics. Thus, under the
regulations, claimants have little or no opportunity to question, to re-
spond to, or to revise adverse evidence that is set up against them by
the medical-vocational regulations.
Claimants challenging this heavy reliance on administrative notice
succeeded at first, but recently have suffered several significant defeats.
In a 1981 case, Holmes v. Harris, the Southern District of Alabama
found that precluding claimants from presenting contrary rebuttal em-
ployment evidence at a hearing violated the Administrative Procedure
Act.' 72 The magistrate's recommendation in Holmes also found that
the Medical-Vocational Guidelines and the administrative notice used
in them violated 42 U.S.C. § 405(b)'s "adduced at the hearing" require-
ment 73 because the Administrative Law Judge had not even men-
tioned that he was noticing the facts contained in the medical-
vocational regulations and would later base his decision upon them. In
1982, however, three circuits (including the eleventh) held that the reg-
ulation's use of administrative notice does not violate the APA. '
4
Other cases have challenged the regulations' inconsistency with
the Social Security statute. ' 5 In Santise v. Harris,176 for example, the
regulations were challenged as being inconsistent with the Social Se-
172. No. 79-0730-H, recommendation of magistrate, slip op. at 13-15, (S.D.Ala. Aug. 18,
1980).
173. "Upon request by [a claimant] who makes a showing in writing that his or her rights
may be prejudiced by any decision the Secretary has rendered, [the Secretary] shall give [the
claimant] reasonable notice and opportunity for a hearing with respect to such decision, and,
if a hearing is held, shall, on the basis of evidence adduced at the hearing, affirm, modify, or
reverse his findings of fact and such decision. 42 U.S.C. §405(b) (Supp. IV 1981)
(emphasis supplied).
174. See McCoy v. Schweiker, 683 F.2d 1138, 1145-46 (8th Cir. 1982); Rivers v.
Schweiker, 684 F.2d 1144, 1155 /5th Cir. 1982); Broz v. Schweiker, 677 F.2d 1351, 1362 (1 1th
Cir. 1982). The relevant section of the Administrative Procedure Act provides: "When an
agency decision rests on official notice of a material fact not appearing in the evidence in the
record, a party is entitled, on a timely request, to an opportunity to show the contrary." 5
U.S.C. §556(e) (1977).
175. In Cummings v. Harris, 513 F. Supp. 35 (S.D.Ohio 1980), the court stated that:
As a general matter, use of the tables can be viewed as conflicting with the statutory
requirements and Sixth Circuit precedents. 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(2)(A) provides that a
person is disabled when he can neither return to his former job nor, considering his age,
education and work experience, engage in any other "gainful work which exists in the
national economy." Under the shifting burden of production rule in this Circuit, the
emphasized language would seem to put the burden on the Secretary to show (a) that
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curity Act. 177 The district court found that the Act required the Ad-
ministrative Law Judge to determine, as a matter of fact, whether a
claimant is capable of engaging in substantial gainful activity, and that
the regulations, which require the judge to make only subsidiary find-
ings and then dictate a conclusion on substantial gainful activity, were
inconsistent with the Act and could not be relied upon in denying bene-
fits. The court in Santise concluded that "the newly promulgated regu-
lations are at odds with the established judicial interpretation of the
Act, which requires individualized treatment of each claim."' 78 Like
the Holmes holding, however, Santise was subsequently overturned by
the court of appeals. 1
79
In addition to statutory challenges, claimants also have attacked,
under federal common law, the official notice concept set out in the
regulations. 180 Although there is no absolute requirement that a voca-
tional expert be used in all cases, the leading case in the area, Garrett v.
Richardson,'8' and its progeny make the use of vocational testimony
necessary in many cases and thus limit the use of administrative notice.
The rationale for this position is that although some claimants may be
able to do a wide range of jobs in a general category of work, for exam-
ple, light work,' 82 the claimant should not be required to disprove his
or her ability to perform all of the jobs imaginable within a broad cate-
gory. Based on this rationale, the courts have held that administrative
notice is insufficient to sustain the Secretary's burden of showing that
there are jobs a claimant is capable of performing and that vocational
testimony about specific jobs is necessary in most cases. Many courts,
despite the promulgation of the medical-vocational regulations, have
claimant could perform some job and (b) that job exists in the national economy. The
tables stop short of this.
513 F. Supp. at 38.
176. 501 F. Supp. 274 (D.N.J. 1980), rev'd sub nom. Santise v. Schweiker, 676 F.2d 925,
934-35 (3d Cir. 1982).
177. Id. at 277. Specifically, §223(d)(2)(A) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.
§423(d)(2)(A) (1976), states that a claimant "shall be determined to be under a disability
only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not
only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work
experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national
economy ... "
178. Santise, 501 F. Supp. at 277.
179. Santise v. Schweiker, 676 F.2d 925, 934-35 (3d Cir. 1982).
180. Meneses v. Secretary of HEW, 442 F.2d 803, 809 (D.C.Cir. 1971) limits the use of
administrative notice. For a discussion of that case and methods that might be used to get
around its prohibitions on administrative notice, see MASHAw, HEARINGS, supra note 12, at
79-82.
181. 471 F.2d 598 (8th Cir. 1972).
182. See McLamore v. Weinberger, 538 F.2d 572, 575 (4th Cir. 1976).
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adhered to this requirement, reversing cases in which the use of admin-
istrative notice by way of the Medical-Vocational Guidelines was the
basis for denying a claimant's eligibility.'83 Courts also have deter-
mined that the requirements for vocational testimony mandate the Sec-
retary to specify a particular job or jobs which the claimant can
perform 184 and have struck down the use of the vocational regulations
on this basis. Other courts have said simply that "reliance on a grid,
drawn in advance to cover a wide variety of individual cases, does not
satisfy [the Department of Health and Human Services'] obligation of
basing its conclusion on substantial evidence."' 85
Another basis for challenges to the Medical-Vocational Guidelines
is that the regulations create an irrebuttable presumption and thus vio-
late the due process clause of the Constitution. In dismissing this argu-
ment, one court has stated that "[tlhe short answer to this theory is that
the regulations do not create any presumption that requires the exclu-
sion of relevant, rebuttal evidence, but rather direct a conclusion that is
183. Cowart v. Schweiker, 662 F.2d 731,735-36 (11 th Cir. 1981); Woodworth v. Secretary
of HEW, 626 F.2d 46, 47 (8th Cir. 1980); Parker v. Harris, 626 F.2d 225, 233-34 (2d Cir.
1980); Minuto v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 525 F. Supp. 261, 266 (S.D.N.Y.
1981); Colyer v. Harris, 519 F. Supp. 692, 694-95 (S.D.Ohio 1981); Cummings v. Harris, 513
F. Supp. 35, 38 (S.D.Ohio 1980); Peryea v. Harris, No. 80-21, slip op. at 4-5 (D.Vt. February
10, 1981). Other courts have found that vocational-expert testimony is unnecessary when
the medical-vocational regulations apply. See Kirk v. Secretary of Health and Human Serv-
ices, 667 F.2d 524 (6th Cir. 1981); New v. Harris, 505 F. Supp. 721, 726 (S.D.Ohio 1980). In
New, the court considered a statement in Hephner v. Matthews, 574 F.2d 359 (6th Cir. 1978)
that phrases such as "light work" were unacceptable because it was not based on a clear
standard. 574 F. Supp. at 362-63. (Hephner was decided before the "grid" became applica-
ble law.) The court in New was satisfied by the definition of "light work" in the regulation
itself. See 20 C.F.R. §404.1510(c) (1982). Because of the amount of information that went
into production of the grid, the court in New found that the testimony of a vocational expert
would be necessary only when a case presented "unusual facts." 505 F. Supp. at 726. The
court did not specify what facts qualified as "unusual."
Kirk v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, although upholding the Medical-
Vocational Guidelines, did so in a very limited fashion. In Kirk, the court reconciled the
requirement of individualized decision-making with the role of the Medical-Vocational grid.
The court found that "a claimant's particular characteristics [had to] be evaluated before a
disability decision is reached; the grid merely identifies the weight to be given each charac-
teristic found." 667 F.2d at 530. Further, "the grid is only used when the components of the
grid precisely match the characteristics of the claimant. Thus, the only role the guidelines
play is to take administrative notice of the availability of jobs, or lack thereof, for claimants
whose abilities are accurately described by the grid." 667 F.2d at 531. In the case of a
claimant whose disability profile did not fit the grid, as when non-exertional limitations were
involved, the court commented that the Secretary would need the help of expert testimony to
satisfy his burden of proof as to jobs available to that particular claimant. 667 F.2d at 531.
184. See Peryea v. Harris, No. 80-21, slip op. at 5 (D.Vt. February 10, 1981) (citing Bas-
tien v. Califano, 572 F.2d 908, 912-13 (2d Cir. 1978)).
185. Santise v. Harris, 501 F. Supp. 274, 276 (D.N.J. 1980), rev'd sub nom. Santise v.
Schweiker, 676 F.2d 925 (3d Cir. 1982).
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based on consideration of all relevant factors and evidence."'' 8 6
Challenges to the regulations can be expected to continue until the
Supreme Court decides the issue. At that point, the cases may move
toward interpretation and application of the regulations and away from
direct challenges.
VI. THE STATUTORY STANDARD
To this point, this article has criticized the guidelines for failing to
achieve their major goals of accuracy and consistency and has outlined
some of the court challenges brought against the guidelines. Subse-
quent sections will discuss proposals for improving decision-making
under the Social Security system. But there is no panacea for the con-
sistency problems plaguing the system, largely because the major stum-
bling block to achieving consistency is not to be found in the system
but rather in the standard of disability itself.
A. The Diculty of a Vague Standard
To even the most casual observer, the vagueness of the Social Se-
curity standard is readily apparent. The notion of "inability to engage
in any substantial gainful activity by reason of a medically determina-
ble physical or mental impairment. .. ,187 contains a myriad of factors
that need to be considered in decision-making beyond those set forth in
the statute.18 8 Physical ailments, perhaps one of the most measurable
of the factors, are themselves often difficult to diagnose with precision.
In addition, many disabilities are based on purely emotional problems,
and others involve a mix of physical and emotional impairments. The
diagnosis of the emotional component of a disability determination is
often more ambiguous than that of a physical one and, when one adds
the subjective nature of pain and restrictions in activities and interests
that can be caused by emotional factors, consistency even on a solely
medical basis would be difficult to find. But the standard also requires
fact-finders to consider the demands of a variety of jobs, the education
of the claimant, the claimant's past work, and any transferable skills
the claimant might possess. The number of variables involved in this
equation of disability, the difficulty involved in accurately measuring
each, and the obvious need to synthesize these variables into a determi-
186. Stallings v. Harris, 493 F. Supp. 956, 960 (W.D.Tenn. 1980), afl'd sub nom. Kirk v.
Secretary of Health and Human Services, 667 F.2d 524 (6th Cir. 1981).
187. 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(1)(A) (1976).
188. The statute goes on to speak of "impairment[s] which can be expected to result in
death or which [have] lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less
than 12 months ... ." Id.
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nation embodying an all-or-nothing decision on disability clearly show
the difficulty in achieving accuracy and consistency using the disability
standard. As the variables in any decision increase in either number or
difficulty of measurement, consistency of decision-making becomes
more difficult to define, let alone achieve.
"As Saad Z. Nagi has remarked, the concept of total disability
simply may not lend itself to indications or criteria on the basis of
which routine decisions can be made."' 9 The Medical-Vocational
Guidelines have attempted to create consistency through a process of
categorical decision-making. The main problem with the guidelines,
however, is not that they need fine-tuning and refinement, but that the
standard for which they are attempting to achieve accurate and consis-
tent decisions is one that simply defies mechanical, classified, and high-
ly routinized determinations. Added to this basic difficulty is the
manner in which public policy is intertwined with any disability
decision:
The fundamental imponderable under this congressional statute is
the determination of how much employment-directed effort soci-
ety is to insist on for borderline claimants, none of whom are to-
tally incapacitated, as a precondition of subsidized premature
retirement. Such a question is ultimately a public question for lay
determination, not a medical question or a psychological-psychiat-
ric question. And it is also one not readily susceptible of signifi-
cant clarification by the traditional common law process of
reported and rationalized decisions and case-by-case precedent
building.. .. 9
Even Jerry Mashaw, perhaps the leading scholar in the Social Security
area and one who has supported the concept of categorical decision-
making in disability cases, has recognized the difficult value judgments
involved and, at least in the past, has recognized that "[s]uch adjudica-
tions by their very nature elude objective verification and cannot be
effectively controlled for consistency."' 9
189. R. DIXON, supra note 11, at 141 (quoting letter from Saad Z. Nagi to Roger C.
Cramton, Chairman, Adminstrative Conference of the United States (November 26, 1971)).
190. Id. at 133.
191. Mashaw, Due Process, supra note 73, at 45:
SSA disability adjudications should perhaps be viewed as really concerned with diffi-
cult value judgments - individualized exemptions from the moral, social, and eco-
nomic constraints of the work ethic, determined by a complex of medical, vocational,
and environmental factors as they impinge on particular individuals. Such adjudica-
tions by their very nature elude objective verification and cannot be effectively con-
trolled for consistency. Accordingly, they can be legitimized only by invoking either
authority or consent. In a democracy consent is undoubtedly the preferable justifica-
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B. Changing the Statutory Standard
Because a major difficulty with achieving accuracy and consis-
tency in disability determinations is the rather vague and imprecise
concept of disability itself, especially as embodied in the statutory defi-
nition, the obvious answer for resolving the accuracy and, conse-
quently, the consistency conundrum, is a change in the disability
standard. In addition to the truism that obvious answers often provide
poor solutions, however, is the political reality that, at least right now,
there will be much discussion, but little probability, of major changes
in the Social Security disability determination system. 192 Additionally,
it can be convincingly argued that, because of the interplay among the
myriad of programs that can be broadly termed welfare, 193 reforms of
the Social Security system should be done as part of an overall evalua-
tion of the entire public benefits system.' 94 Given the need both to
understand and to deal with the interplay between such public welfare
programs as Veterans Benefits, Social Security, Unemployment Insur-
ance, and Aid to Familes with Dependent Children, it is the height of
understatement to say that prospects are unlikely.
Despite the unlikelihood of major revisions in the public disability
benefits system or even changes in the statutory definition of disability
under the Social Security system, some discussion of potential changes
in the statutory standard for disability is worthwhile. In fact, changes
have been proposed by the Reagan administration' 95 and scholars of
tion. Its procedural approximation would seem to be the fullest possible participation
in the decisional process.
192. New York Times, January 21, 1983, §A, at 12, col. 1. See also Report ofthe National
Commission on Social Security Reform, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE REPORTS WITH SO-
CIAL SECURITY (CCH) No. 1127 (Special Edition - Jan. 27, 1983); although some fiscal and
structural changes in Social Security have been endorsed by Congressional Committees, no
significant changes in disability determination procedures have come to light.
193. See Martin, Welfare Law: The Problem of Terminology, 60 CORNELL L. REv. 792,
792 (1975).
194. Martin, Welfare Law: .4 Challenging Fieldfor Lawyers, 64 ABA JOURNAL 1255,
1258 (1978).
195. In May, 1981 the Reagan administration proposed that, to receive Social Security
disability, the claimant's disability should last or be expected to last for a period of 24
months as opposed to the currently required 12 months, that there be a waiting period of six
months instead of five (it had been reduced from six to five in 1972), and that recipients have
had sufficient earnings in 30 rather than 20 of the past 40 quarters. Additionally, the current
administration proposed adoption of a standard of disability that would base disability de-
terminations solely upon an individual's medical condition without reference to previous
work experience, educational background, or age. SUBCOMMITTEE ON SOCIAL SECURITY OF
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, 97TH CONG., IST SESS., REAGAN ADMINISTRA-
TION DISABILITY PROPOSALS 3-13 (Comm. Print 1981). The Reagan administration has
since withdrawn these proposals.
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the Social Security system. 196 One suggestion has been "clarification of
the presumption to apply in close cases . . . ." ' Such a change, de-
pending on the nature of the presumption, might create greater friction
between those who are taxed to support the disability system and those
who apply for its benefits and tacitly consent to be ruled by its statutory
definition and regulations. 198
Perhaps the most controversial change would be to eliminate from
the disability equation all vocational factors, and to make disability
dependent solely upon physical or perhaps both physical and mental
impairments. This type of reform, which has been proposed by some
scholars' 99 and more recently by the Reagan administration,2 ° ° un-
doubtedly would create greater accuracy and consistency measured by
the reform standard but would most likely move us to a system that
favored younger and better educated claimants.2 10 Such a system
would move us further away from a concept of disability geared to-
wards differentiating between those who can and cannot work. In ad-
dition, such a statutory change in the definition of disability in the
Social Security area would undoubtedly impose tremendous pressures
on other public benefit programs to which those not eligible for DI or
SSI would need to turn. The issue of a dramatically changed disability
standard opens a morass of public policy issues far beyond the scope of
this article.
Thus, given the existing political realities, in addition to a myriad
of difficult policy issues and substantive trade-offs involved in a re-defi-
nition of the statutory concept of disability, we are left with a vague
196. See, e.g., R. DIXON, supra note 11, at 139-40.
197. Id. at 139.
198. Presumptions in some cases may already be in effect. For a brief discussion, see
LEGAL AID BUREAU OF MARYLAND, INC., LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION QUALITY IM-
PROVEMENT PROJECT, FINAL EVALUATION REPORT, DISABILITY EVALUATION ASSISTANCE
PROJECT 14 (October 1981) [hereinafter cited as LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION QUALITY
IMPROVEMENT PROJECT].
199. See, e.g., R. DIXON, supra note 11, at 139.
200. SUBCOMMITTEE ON SOCIAL SECURITY, supra note 195, at 3.
201. The Administration's proposal to drop vocational factors from the disability equa-
tion would most affect older, poorly educated, or nonwhite claimants; yet these groups are
composed of individuals who are more likely to be disabled. A study published in 1972
found that 42% of the disabled failed to attend school past the 8th grade but only 22% of the
nation at large did not achieve at least this educational level. Allan & Cinsky, General Char-
acteristics of the Disabled Population, 35 Soc. SEC. BULL. No. 8, 24, 25 (Aug. 1972). This
study also found that 21% of the black population as opposed to 11% of the white population
was severely disabled. 1d. Another study found that minority group members were more
likely to be receiving Social Security Disability benefits in that 2.7% of insured minority
workers received benefits as compared with 1.9% of insured white workers. Goff, Disabled
Worker Benefciaries Under O.A.S.D.H.I.: Regional and State Patterns, 36 Soc. SEC. BULL.
No. 9, 3, 7 (Sept. 1973).
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standard, perhaps an almost unadministerable one, encompassing a
large number of soft variables. But difficult-to-administer, vague stan-
dards, as this article suggests, are not necessarily bad. In fact, in the
Social Security area, any standard that truly attempts to differentiate
between those who can and cannot work will of necessity be somewhat
vague. Difficult-to-administer standards are by no means unique to the
Social Security system,2 "2 and there is no question that the concept of
disability will continue to create problems of consistency and accuracy
in the future. But a number of steps, some of which have already been
tried to a degree by the Social Security Administration, should be con-
sidered, adopted, or refined to promote quality in process and decision-
making.
VII. SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT
A. Case Development
Among the areas for improvement in the Social Security process is
increased case development at both the state agency and Bureau of
Hearings and Appeals levels. This suggestion is by no means novel,20 3
and the Social Security Administration has made efforts in this area.
The comment of Jerry Mashaw and his coauthors remains a telling crit-
icism of the system today: "Observation of hearings leads more often
to bifurcation between clear and underdeveloped cases than between
clear and close cases."' 4 Despite its burden to assist claimants in fully
developing their records, and the recommendations of students of the
system that case development would vastly improve decision-making,
the SSA has failed to develop records in a meaningful and effective
fashion. This problem exists at the Bureau of Hearings and Appeals
level but is especially troublesome at the state agency level where
proper development could obviate the need for any additional deci-
sion-making steps, or at least make those additional steps far more
efficient.2 °5
202. The "public interest" standard used in granting radio and television licenses is such
a standard. See R. DIXON, supra note 11, at 18. As another example, federal courts and
administrative agencies have long struggled with the Freedom of Information Act's vaguely
worded exemptions. See The Wall Street Journal, December 15, 1981, at 33, ol. 3.
203. See 43 Fed. Reg. 27,507, 27,508 (codified at 1 C.F.R. Chapter III, §305.78-2(B)(1)).
204. MASHAW, HEARINGS, supra note 12, at 18.
205. These observations of the problem of case development come from having super-
vised students in clinical programs at both the University of Maryland School of Law and
the Cornell Law School. The cases the author has supervised have been accepted by the
clinic almost exclusively at the hearing stage. Although our advocacy for clients involves
development of legal issues, the framing of questions at the hearing stage, and the prepara-
tion. of any necessary or helpful documents or memoranda, it seems that the greatest assist-
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Increased case development would make the decision-making pro-
cess more accurate, potentially more consistent, and, if done at early
stages, more efficient although not necessarily cost-effective. The So-
cial Security Administration should continue to work to achieve this
very basic goal.
B. Developing Precedents
Another suggestion for the Social Security Administration is con-
tinued work at developing and communicating precedents. Recom-
mendations for this reform are by no means new; in fact, numerous
studies have pointed to the additional need for precedental material.2"
The continued development of precedents would produce several
advantages. Most important, it would allow the Social Security Ad-
ministration to move toward the most appropriate mix of rules and dis-
cretion in disability determinations. Discretion is obviously needed in
the disability process because of the strong need for individualization.
At the same time, rules aid predictability and foster consistency. The
difficulty, not only for the Social Security Administration but for every
adjudicative system, is how to reach the optimum mix of rules and dis-
cretion.2 °7 One step toward this desideratum is the development of
precedents, for "an agency's normal progression is from unguided dis-
cretion to some use of precedents[,] to clarification of standards[,] to
greater use of precedents[,] to discovery of principles[,] and finally to
formulation of guiding rules and even of governing rules."2 °8 As has
been mentioned many times in this article, the Social Security Admin-
istration, through the adoption of the Medical-Vocational Guidelines,
has gone too far in adopting governing rules. Perhaps one reason for
this error was the ineffective development of precedent in the move
from discretion to rules, because "[tihe best rules are often the ones that
result from recording precedents growing out of exercise of discretion,
coupled with a requirement that the precedents either be followed or
ance we provide claimants is the thorough development and compilation of their medical
records. The administration needs to be more thorough in its development of records con-
cerning both physical ailments and psychiatric impairments, but it is especially lax in the
latter. Whether this is a product of the difficulty in recognizing psychiatric impairments or a
decision by the administration to give less importance to psychiatric impairments is not
clear. For support for the proposition that psychiatric impairments are not conscientiously
considered at the state agency level, see LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION QUALITY IMPROVE-
MENT PROJECT, supra note 198, at 14.
206. See, e.g., MASHAW, HEARINGS, supra note 12, at 105; 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 68,
§9:11.
207. 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 68, §8:7(19), (20).
208. Id. §8:4, at 170.
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that departures from them be acknowledged and explained."2 ° 9
In addition to aiding rule-making, the development of precedent
would provide a helpful foundation from which to approach the diffi-
cult problems involved in applying general rules of disability to the
extraordinarily complex fact patterns of disability cases. Precedents,
not in a sanitized form210 but with strong factual descriptions of the
cases upon which they are based, would give clarity and life to the
rather abstract and generalized principles of disability.2II The develop-
ment of case-based precedents not only would guide decision-makers
in this factually complex field but also would assist claimants and their
counsel in presenting their cases as well as in making the difficult deci-
sion of whether to appeal.21 2
The kind of precedents that might be developed and the way in
which they could be communicated merit some comment. The Social
Security Administration should do a more effective job of including
judicial precedents within its instructional materials to both state agen-
cies and Bureau of Hearings and Appeals employees. To a degree, this
has already been done and it certainly has been a major suggestion of a
number of studies of the system.213 This effort, in addition to making
Social Security decisions more effectively reflect judicial precedents,
might also help relieve the consistency problems that have plagued the
Social Security Administration. 214 The incorporation of judicial prece-
dent, however, is not without its problems given the variance among
circuits in dealing with the disability standard and the tendency of
courts, in a splendidly human way, to construe disability in a common-
sense rather than a strictly legalistic fashion.21 5
In addition to the incorporation of court-based precedent into in-
209. Id. §8:7(15).
210. See Dixon, The Welfare State and Mass Justice.- A Warning From the Social Security
Disability Program, 1972 DUKE L. J. 681, 709.
211. MASHAW, HEARINGS, supra note 12, at 109.
212. In some instances, the Social Security Administration has already created precedents
which simply need to be more effectively communicated to decision-makers. In fact, the
Medical-Vocational Guidelines themselves have within them examples that can be used as
precedents. See, e.g., 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 2, §201.00(h), Example 2 (1982).
213. For example, a regional office report has suggested that the Social Security Adminis-
tration should issue major policy directives to assist uniform interpretation by state agencies
and that court precedents should be incorporated into the Disability Insurance State Manual
(DISM). Dallas Regional SSA Office, Service Delivery Assessment of Social Security Disa-
bility Programs (May 19, 1978) (on file with author).
214. MASHAW, HEARINGS, supra note 12, at 110-15.
215. "The standard which emerges from these decisions in our circuit and elsewhere is a
practical one: whether there is a reasonably firm basis for thinking that this particular
claimant [who has shown inability to perform his usual vocation] can obtain a job within a
reasonably circumscribed labor market." HousE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, SO-
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structional materials, the Appeals Council's decisions should be used
more often and more effectively as precedents. Prior studies have
called for this change 21 6 and have recognized that the Appeals Council
needs to shift its focus from a review of outcomes to the development of
disability principles or precedents.2"7 In addition to developing prece-
dent out of individual cases, the Appeals Council could take adminis-
trative notice of facts that have been proven and developed in a large
number of highly similar cases. 2 18 As mentioned earlier, the major
problem in the development of the Medical-Vocational Guidelines was
that they did not emerge from the natural progression of administrative
rules from cases through precedents and onto guidelines and rules, but
rather developed as a virtually all-inclusive set of decision-making
rules in the absence of strongly-developed precedental materials.
C. Quality-Assurance Systems
The quality of decision-making in the Social Security system could
also be improved by the continued development and more aggressive
application of the Social Security Administration's quality-assurance
system. Advocates have recognized the need for this kind of system in
social welfare claims.219 Its operation has been discussed by others220
and will not be outlined here. The suggestion made here, which is not
CIAL SECURITY AMENDMENTS OF 1967, H. R. REP. No. 544, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1967)
(quoting uncited case).
216. MASHAW, HEARINGS, supra note 12, at 105. The authors point out that development
of precedent by the Appeals Council has drawbacks. The Appeals Council rarely creates
new law or policy; its decisions do not so much establish principles of precedential value as
simply restate what is already in the administrative regulations. Id. at 106.
217. Recommendations of The Administrative Conference of the United States, 43 Fed.
Reg. 27,507, 27,508-509, codofed at 1 C.F.R. Chapter III, §305.78-2(c).
218. But if the information has been developed in the usual course of business of
the agency, if it has emerged from numerous cases, if it has become a part of the
factual equipment of the administrators, it seems undesirable for the agency to
remain oblivious of their own experience and strip themselves of the very stuff
which constitutes their expertness. It appears far more intelligent, if fairness to the
parties permits, to utilize the knowledge that comes from prior acquaintance with
the problems. Laborious proof of what is obvious and notorious is wasteful; or, in
the alternative, decision in disregard of the obvious and notorious in absence of
such laborious proof, is foolish, and contrary to the demands that decisions be as
correct as possible.
MASHAW, HEARINGS, supra note 12, at 81, (quoting MONOGRAPH OF THE ATTORNEY GEN-
ERAL'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, PART 3, 77TH CONG., IST SESS. 72
(SEN. Doc. Nov. 10, 1941)).
219. MASHAW, HEARINGS, supra note 12, at 116-20. See also Mashaw, Management,
supra note 10, at 784-87.
220. Chassman & Rolston, Social Security Disability Hearings:. A Case Study of Quality
Assurance and Due Process, 65 CORNELL L. REv. 801 (1980).
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novel,2 2 ' is simply that the quality-assurance system should be more
aggressive.
D. The Effect of Bias on Decision-Making
In addition to increased rigor in the quality-assurance program,
there needs to be a close look at how the biases of decision-makers
affect the quality of their determinations. Everyone knows that an in-
dividual's own experiences create bias, but only recently have research-
ers begun to study how this bias can affect the decisions of fact-
finders. 22 The social welfare programs and the concept of disability
are emotion-laden topics; some studies have shown that the outcome of
a particular case may be more correlated with the decision-maker's
emotional reaction to a claimant than to factors generally thought to be
determinative of disability.223 The Social Security Administration
needs to examine more closely how factors generally not considered to
be relevant to disability become highly predictive in these cases. And
the SSA also should strive to hire and to train decision-makers who
will base their decisions on factors concerning disability rather than
individual bias.224
E. Review of Unappealed Cases
Accuracy and fairness could be enhanced if the Social Security
Administration would review unappealed cases. Although the SSA
certainly should not force claimants through the reconsideration, hear-
ing, and Appeals Council processes, it is likely that encouraging ap-
peals and reviewing denied cases would increase the aggregate
accuracy of the system. Given the current fiscal squeeze, however, such
221. See Mashaw, Quality, supra note 12, at 834.
222. See Nagel, Bringing the Values of Jurors in Line with the Law, 63 JUDICATURE 189,
191 (1979).
223. One analysis of disability decisions showed that the basic characteristics that should
be important determinants of decisions have virtually no predictive value. These character-
istics include factors found in the Medical-Vocational Guidelines: age, prior work history,
education level, and the claimant's ability to do sedentary, light, medium, or heavy work.
The study concluded:
Hence the cases get decided on other grounds. That is, those grounds that show up as
highly predictive factors in a discriminant factor analysis. [sic] Those factors include
such things as whether the claimant was represented, the existence and character of the
report of a consulting physician, the neediness of the claimant, whether the case in-
volved a medical problem that included disfigurement, and the race and sex of the
claimant.
MASHAW, HEARINGS, supra note 12, at 19.
224. For a brief discussion of the failure of instructional and reporting programs to have




a suggestion is unlikely to be adopted. But unless claimants, many of
whom are unrepresented and may be poorly educated (especially Sup-
plemental Security Income claimants), are highly effective in selecting
cases for appeals, it is hard to argue in favor of the aggregate accuracy
of the present determination process, let alone the justness of the re-
sults. Additionally, in the disability area, many claimants may find it
physically or emotionally too difficult to continue through the appeals
process without a great deal of assistance. Estimates of aggregate accu-
racy and fairness are inconclusive absent consideration of unappealed
claims.
F. Revising the Medical- Vocational Guidelines
Although developing precedent along the lines discussed earlier
seems to be one of the best ways for creating sound rules and guidelines
in Social Security disability decision-making, this process is an evolu-
tionary one which is likely to require years of development. Because of
major inconsistency and inaccuracy problems in Social Security deci-
sion-making, some form of guidelines, as a stop-gap measure, seems
appropriate. The Medical-Vocational Guidelines, despite their many
drawbacks, might be modified in several ways and serve this function.
First, the Guidelines need to include in the disability equation the criti-
cal factor of adjustment. The current regulation's exclusion of this fac-
tor, so important to assessing disability, leads to both inaccuracy and
inconsistency. Although its inclusion in the disability equation has the
potential for seriously undermining the consistency goals so strongly
espoused in the Medical-Vocational Guidelines, it is important enough
to the disability determination that a trade-off is required. Second, the
use of the Medical-Vocational Guidelines should be limited to the ini-
tial determination and reconsideration stages. Unlike the decision-
makers at these stages, the Administrative Law Judges are highly
trained and their independence is largely assured. For the less quali-
fied and less independent decision-makers at the initial stages, how-
ever, substantial curbs on discretion are justified. Although the use of
different decision-making regulations between the initial stages and the
hearing stage would add another cause of inter-stage variance, there
are already so many causes of variations between stages that this addi-
tional one seems inconsequential. Third, the Guidelines should be up-
dated to take into account the very latest data on the availability of jobs
and the physical and vocational requirements for them. This is impor-
tant not only because the data upon which the current Guidelines are
based was outdated at the time the Guidelines were developed, but also
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because of the tremendous changes that technology has created in the
job market.
The preceding suggestions for tuning the disability process are by
no means exhaustive. Nor do they offer a panacea for the consistency
and accuracy problems which are truly the results of the complex, sub-
jective, and somewhat elusive concept of disability itself. They are set
forth simply to show that measures, some of which already have been
partly adopted by the Social Security Administration, can be taken that
are alternatives to the attempted solution in the existing Medical-Voca-
tional Guidelines.
VIII. THE NEED FOR EMPIRICAL STUDIES
This article's criticism and comments about the Medical-Voca-
tional Guidelines have been predominantly normative and analytical.
But assuming the Social Security Administration plans to retain the
Medical-Vocational Guidelines, much empirical work needs to be
done.225 Empirical analysis might effectively test the Medical-Voca-
tional Guidelines for the goals of consistency and accuracy.
One area for empirical study would be to test whether the guide-
lines have aided consistency. One of the goals for regulations was to
lessen the variation among Administrative Law Judges on how cases
were decided. In addition, variation should be lessened-among other
decision-makers in the system as well as in the various geographic ar-
eas across the country. Assuming that similar cases reach most Admin-
istrative Law Judges, a gross but perhaps fairly representative measure
of the Medical-Vocational Guidelines' effect might be found by exam-
ining the variation in reversal rates among Administrative Law Judges
as well as other decision-makers to see if it has decreased. Although
other factors, such as quality assurance programs and regional varia-
tion, would need to be taken into account in drawing conclusions about
the effects of the guidelines, empiricists likely could design a method
for reliably testing the grid's impact on consistency.
Naturally, consistency should be" increased as measured against
the vocational factors which make up the major features of the Medi-
cal-Vocational Guidelines. If consistency has not increased dramati-
cally when measured against these factors, it would be reasonable to
say that the Medical-Vocational Guidelines have truly been a failure.
But, as set out earlier in this article, consistency as measured against
225. In a response, dated June 28, 1982, to a Freedom of Information request, the SSA
stated that it has no studies underway to evaluate the effectiveness of the Medical-Voca-
tional Guidelines in aiding decision-making. (Copy of response on file with author).
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these factors is not a reliable measurement of accuracy under the statu-
tory definition of disability.
To better assess accuracy, the Social Security Administration
should consider evaluating determinations under the grid system by
comparing those decisions with determinations made by clinical teams.
These clinical teams, similar to those in a comparable past study,226
could evaluate claimants in a number of areas including medical and
psychological status as well as occupational, vocational, and social
skills. These teams, with participants from a variety of disciplines,
should be able to form a relatively accurate disability evaluation. Al-
though there are obviously problems in attempting to use determina-
tions made by these teams as a measure for accuracy within the
disability process, the absence of any objective external reference in
disability cases leaves these teams as the most reasonable alternative
available. If the hypothesis of the Social Security Administration is
correct - that accuracy should be increased under the Medical-Voca-
tional Guidelines - there should be a higher correlation between the
decisions made by the team and those made by the claims examiners
and Administrative Law Judges using the Medical-Vocational Guide-
lines than in controls decided without the assistance of these guidelines.
In addition to performing studies to check the accuracy and con-
sistency of decision-making under the Medical-Vocational Guidelines,
the Social Security Administration should undertake a study to see if
the guidelines are being applied correctly. This study should focus on
whether cases which should fall under the guidelines are being decided
under them, and, if they are, whether the guidelines are being followed.
In addition, the study should focus on whether decision-makers are
identifying other factors, such as nonexertional impairments, and are
properly using the guidelines as a "framework." Because the Medical-
Vocational Guidelines set up a complex categorical decision-making
process for disability determinations, it is incumbent upon the Social
Security Administration to make sure that this process can and will be
correctly applied by decision-makers.
IX. CONCLUSION
The concept of disability is a vague and elusive one. It is also a
concept requiring an individualized approach and therefore is difficult
to capture within the framework of categorical decision-making. The
Medical-Vocational Guidelines - a complex categorical decision-
226. See R. DIXON, supra note 11, at 65-73. (summarizing S. NAGI, DISABILITY AND RE-
HABILITATION: LEGAL, CLINICAL, AND SELF-CONCEPTS AND MEASUREMENTS (1969)).
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making formula - were expected by the Social Security Administra-
tion to increase both consistency and accuracy in disability determina-
tions. But because of failings within that categorical decision-making
process, such as the failure to focus on certain critical features of disa-
bility and the frailty of certain escape clauses within the process, the
guidelines are unlikely to achieve either of these goals.
Assuming the Social Security Administration continues to use the
Medical-Vocational Guidelines, it should conduct a number of empiri-
cal studies to determine whether and to what extent the guidelines have
achieved their intended goals. If they have not, the Social Security Ad-
ministration should consider alternative means of accomplishing these
ends.
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APPENDIX A
TABLE NO. 2-RESIDUAL FUNCTIONAL CAPACITY:
MAXIMUM SUSTAINED WORK CAPABILITY
LIMITED TO LIGHT WORK AS A RESULT
OF SEVERE MEDICALLY
DETERMINABLE IMPAIRMENT(S)-






202.05 . Advanced age ....
202.06 .. do ............
..do ............
..do ............



















Limited or less .......
.do ...............
..do ...............
High school graduate or
more-does not provide
for direct entry into
skilled work.
High school graduate or
more-provides for
direct entry into skilled
work.
High school graduate or
more-does not provide
for direct entry into
skilled work.
.do ...............
High school graduate or
more-provides for
direct entry into skilled
work.
Illiterate or unable to
communicate in English.
Limited or less-At least
literate and able to
communicate in English.
Limited or less .......
.do ...............




Illiterate or unable to
communicate in English.
Limited or less-At least
literate and able to
communicate in English.
Limited or less .......
..do ...............




a 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 2, Table No. 2 (1982). ("do" means "ditto").





Unskilled or none ....
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APPENDIX B
TABLE NO. 3-RESIDUAL FUNCTIONAL CAPACITY:
MAXIMUM SUSTAINED WORK CAPABILITY
LIMITED TO MEDIUM WORK AS A
RESULT OF SEVERE MEDICALLY
DETERMINABLE IMPAIRMENT(S)b
















































Marginal or none .....
Limited or less .......
Limited .............
Limited or less .......
.do ...............
High school graduate or
more ..............
High school graduate or
more-does not provide
for direct entry into
skilled work.
..do ...............
High school graduate or
more-provides for
direct entry into skilled
work.




High school graduate or
m ore ...............
High school graduate or
more-does not provide
for direct entry into
skilled work.
.. do ...............
High school graduate or
more-provides for
direct entry into skilled
work.
Limited or less .......
..do ...............
..do ...............
High school graduate or
m ore ...............
High school graduate or
more-does not provide


























































203.23 ... .. do ............
203.24 ... .. do ............
203.25 ... Younger individual
203.26 ... .. do ............





203.30 ... .. do ............
203.31 ... .. do ............
for direct entry into
skilled work.
. .do ...............
High school graduate or
more-provides for
direct entry into skilled
work.
Limited or less .......
.. do ...............
..do ...............
High school graduate or
m ore ...............
High school graduate or
more-does not provide
for direct entry into
skilled work.
.. do ...............
High school graduate or
more-provides for


















b 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 2, Table No. 3 (1982).
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